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Mysteries, Conspiracies, and Inquiries: 
Reflections on the Power of Superstition, 
Suspicion, and Scrutiny
Simon Susen
Abstract. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of Luc Bol-
tanski’s account of the multifaceted relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries in modern societies.1 It is striking that, although this important aspect of 
Boltanski’s oeuvre has been commented on by several scholars2, his principal contribu-
tions to this area of investigation have been largely overlooked and received hardly any 
serious attention by researchers in the humanities and social sciences. This paper is an 
attempt to fill this noticeable gap in the literature. Thus, rather than covering the entire 
breadth and depth of Boltanski’s writings, the paper will focus on the valuable insights 
his work offers into the relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries.3 To 
this end, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part comprises an overview of 
Boltanski’s central theoretical contributions to our understanding of mysteries, conspir-
acies, and inquiries. The second part offers some critical reflections on important issues 
arising from Boltanski’s examination of the relationship between mysteries, conspira-
cies, and inquiries – especially with regard to its limitations and shortcomings.




In the modern world, the ‘thematics of mystery, conspiracy, and 
inquiry’4 can hardly be ignored. At least since the late nineteenth and early 
1 This paper focuses on Boltanski (2014 [2012]); cf. Boltanski (2012). See also, for example: Bol-
tanski and Claverie (2007); Boltanski, Claverie, Offenstadt, and Van Damme (2007). In addition, 
see, for instance: Boltanski (1973a); Boltanski (1975); Boltanski (1987 [1982]); Boltanski (2002a); 
Boltanski (2002b); Boltanski (2008); Boltanski (2011 [2009]); Boltanski and Browne (2014); Bol-
tanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]); Boltanski, Darré, and Schiltz (1984); Boltanski and Esquerre 
(2014); Boltanski, Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Boltanski and Maldidier (1970); Boltan-
ski and Maldidier (1977); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]); Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1983); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2000); Boltanski and Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]).
2 See, for instance: Bessière (2012); Corcuff (2014); Latour (2012); Meyer (2012); Ossandón 
(2016); Russell (2016); Shams (2016); Strand (2016).
3 See esp. Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. xiv–xviii (Preface), pp. 1–39 (Chapter 1: ‘REALITY versus 
Reality’), and pp. 224–267 (Chapter 6: ‘Regulating Sociological Inquiry’).
4 Ibid., p. xiv.
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twentieth centuries, these subjects have occupied a cen-
tral place in ‘the representation of reality’5 and, thus, in 
‘the political metaphysics’6 of modern societies. More 
specifically, they have profoundly shaped the ways in 
which reality has been described, analysed, interpreted, 
explained, and assessed – not only by laypersons navi-
gating social life and researchers studying particular 
aspects of human existence, but also by fiction authors, 
notably those producing crime novels and spy novels, 
two of the most popular literary genres of the modern 
age. One of the most important differences between, on 
the one hand, academic researchers and, on the other 
hand, laypersons and fiction writers concerns the quest 
for different kinds of validity. Indeed, it is the pursuit of 
‘scientific’ validity through which the former seek to dis-
tinguish themselves from the latter, including from the 
many other (pseudo- or non-scientific) modes of inquiry 
that, over the past centuries, have emerged in the socie-
ties they examine. In this context, one may differentiate 
between three principal epistemic forms: 
a. ordinary epistemic forms, which are produced, 
reproduced, and transformed by everyday actors, 
seeking to cope with the various demands thrown at 
them in the course of their everyday lives; 
b. fictional epistemic forms, which are constructed, 
reconstructed, and deconstructed by writers, aiming 
to tell stories based – in most cases – on a combina-
tion of imaginary worlds and real worlds, with the 
former being directly or indirectly inspired by the 
latter; and 
c. scientific epistemic forms, which are generated and 
employed by researchers and experts, allowing for 
an analytic, logical, methodical, rational, explanato-
ry, evidence-based, and/or evaluative immersion in, 
engagement with, and understanding of the world 
and/or the universe or multiverse.
Interestingly, in each of them, different types of 
inquiry may play a more or less significant role in the 
symbolically mediated and discursively filtered repre-
sentation of reality. There are not only (a) ordinary and 
common-sense-based types of inquiry, (b) fictional and 
literary types of inquiry, and (c) scientific and research-
based types of inquiry, but also numerous other vari-
ants of inquiry – such as political, cultural, economic, 
judicial, criminal, technological, military, demographic, 
and environmental ones. In terms of both form and sub-
stance, these types of inquiry may overlap, implying that 
their respective classification is not always unambiguous. 
A key feature that, to a greater or lesser degree, all types 
of inquiry share is the ambition to uncover the consti-
5 Ibid., pp. xiv and xv.
6 Ibid., p. xviii.
tution of an underlying reality, which tends to be con-
cealed beneath the veil of everyday modes of perception, 
appreciation, interpretation, and action.
Undoubtedly, both the natural sciences and the 
social sciences are, to a considerable extent, motivated by 
the goal to penetrate into core, if not noumenal, levels of 
reality, thereby challenging the assumptions derived from 
people’s everyday engagement with the realm of appear-
ances. Three fields of investigation are crucial to Boltan-
ski’s project7: (a) psychiatry, notably its nosological con-
struction of paranoia, reflected in the explosion of count-
less inquiries, in many cases protracted to the point of 
delirium; (b) political science, notably its attempt to shift 
issues around ‘paranoia’ from the psychic to the social 
level, thereby moving from the scientifically inspired ter-
rain of ‘mystery’ to the ideologically driven terrain of 
‘conspiracy’, including ‘conspiracy theories’8; (c) sociol-
ogy, notably its determination to shed light on subjacent 
causal mechanisms, structures, and forces, whose exist-
ence largely escapes common-sense modes of existing in, 
engaging with, and attributing meaning to the world.
At the heart of Boltanski’s approach lies the thesis 
that the task of ‘the representation of reality’9 is inex-
tricably linked to the challenge of grasping the ‘changes 
that affected the way reality itself was instituted dur-
ing the period in question’10. Particularly important in 
this respect is the relationship between reality and the 
nation-state, including both their material and their 
symbolic (re-)construction. Mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries have been – and will continue to be – essential 
ingredients of this deep intertwinement between reality 
and the state.11 
Drawing on both the natural sciences and the social 
sciences, including educational sciences and popula-
tion studies (especially their use of large data sets and 
statistics), key variants of the nation-state project began 
to impose themselves on the course of modern history, 
‘eliminating the gap between lived reality and instituted 
reality, between subjectivities and the objective arrange-
ments that served as their framework’12, between the 
world as it appears to, and is experienced by, ordinary 
actors and the world as it is empirically structured and 
factually organized by solidified, and partly formalized, 
modes of action and interaction. Arguably, the remov-
al of this chasm is inherent both in the idea and in the 
realization of the nation-state.13 
7 See ibid., pp. xiv–xv.
8 See ibid., esp. Chapter 5.
9 Ibid., pp. xiv and xv.
10 Ibid., p. xv.
11 See ibid., pp. 15–17.
12 Ibid., p. 16 (italics removed from the word ‘subjectivities’)
13 See ibid., pp. 16 and 276n17. See Sassen (2008 [2006]), p. 15.
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Put in Habermasian terms, the nation-state embod-
ies a curious synthesis of lifeworld and system. Put in 
Foucauldian terms, the nation-state constitutes ‘an 
agency of self-awareness, control, and governance’14, 
capable of guaranteeing ‘the organization, stability, 
security, and consciousness of that [seemingly] natural 
order’15, within which a given population is placed and 
by which it is defined. Through this ‘utopian synthesis 
between state and nation’16, reality was at once lived 
by everyday actors and instituted by sets of organiza-
tional structures, ‘treated as already in existence and as 
requiring a supplementary effort to bring it into being’17, 
as always-already-there and as always-still-to-be-con-
structed. Irrespective of whether or not one conceives 
of this constellation in terms of ‘biopolitics’18, culminat-
ing in the establishment of the welfare state19, it is hard 
to overlook the convergence and alliance ‘between state 
projects and scientific projects’20 in large-scale attempts 
at controlling, classifying, and disciplining territorially 
bound populations.21
MYSTERIES
Mysteries come into being as ‘specific objects’22 that, 
in order to assert their presence, are ‘being detached 
from the background of a stabilized and predictable 
reality whose fragility is revealed by crimes’23 and other 
outside-the-norm happenings. Thus, mysteries are a 
sort of barometer for gauging the material or symbolic 
boundaries of a particular normative order, includ-
ing the parameters by which to make judgements about 
infringements that violate the (implicit or explicit) val-
ues, principles, and conventions on which it is based and 
by which it is sustained.24 One of the main functions of 
14 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 16 (punctuation modified).
15 Ibid., p. 16 (punctuation modified).
16 Ibid., p. 17.
17 Ibid., p. 17 (italics added).
18 See Foucault (2004). See also, for instance: Dean (2013); Esposito 
(2008); Lemke (2011 [2007]); Lemke (2008); Lemke (2010); Pieper, 
Atzert, Karakayali, and Tsianos (2007); Rabinow and Rose (2006).
19 See Swaan (1988). See also, for instance: Barry (1990); Cavanna 
(1998); Cochrane and Clarke (1993); DeMartino (2000); Dwyer (1998); 
Esping-Andersen (1990); Forder (1984); Hewitt (1992); Kumlin and 
Rothstein (2005); Leonard (1997); Marshall (1981); Mommsen (1981); 
Pinker (1979); Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny (2005); Thane (1982).
20 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 17.
21 See Wagner (1992) and Wagner (1994).
22 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. xv.
23 Ibid., p. xv (italics added).
24 On the concept of ‘normative order’, see, for instance: Forst (2013); 
Forst (2015), esp. pp. 117, 118, 119, 121n30, 125, and 126; Forst and 
Günther (2011a); Forst and Günther (2011b). See also, for example: 
Allen, Forst, and Haugaard (2014); Forst (2002 [1994]); Forst (2012 
the nation-state is reflected in ‘the project of organizing 
and unifying reality’25 or – put in sociological terms – 
‘of constructing reality for a given population in a given 
territory’26. This undertaking, of course, was met with 
several obstacles – not least capitalism’s inherent tenden-
cy to transcend local, regional, national, and continental 
borders.
‘A mystery arises from an event, however unimpor-
tant it may seem, that stands out in some way against 
a background ’27 or ‘against the traces of a past event’28, 
which is not immediately accessible to those who seek 
to shed light on its enigmatic constitution. Such a back-
ground is composed of taken-for-granted assumptions, 
ordinary understandings, and human (that is, both indi-
vidual and collective) experiences. The phenomenology 
of the lifeworld is defined by the spatiotemporal constel-
lations brought about by a constantly evolving ensem-
ble of sociohistorical backgrounds. A mystery is associ-
ated with attributes such as ‘singularity’, ‘irregularity’, 
‘abnormality’, ‘deviance’, and ‘rupture’.29 It stands for ‘an 
irruption of the world in the heart of reality’30 – that is, 
for an uncanny event, or set of events, failing to fit the 
normative structure of a particular situational, interac-
tional, or societal order.
We may draw a distinction between ‘ordinary’ and 
‘enigmatic’ (or ‘mysterious’) events. The former con-
firm and reinforce the apparent normality and regu-
larity of a particular set of social practices, structures, 
and arrangements. The latter escape – and potentially 
undermine, if not subvert – ‘the normal attributions of 
a specific entity’31. An event may be regarded as ‘enig-
matic’ or ‘mysterious’ if – in exceptional circumstances 
– ‘the nature of the entity to which it can be attributed 
is unknown’32, implying that both the occurrence in 
question and the subject or object presumably associated 
with it remain unidentified. If the entity and/or reasons 
behind an event cannot be explained in a plausible fash-
ion and if, in addition, the event itself falls outside the 
spectrum of ordinary happenings, then it can be charac-
terized as ‘enigmatic’ or ‘mysterious’.
Strictly speaking, then, an event does not have a 
meaning unless it is possible ‘to attribute it to a given 
[2007]); Forst (2013 [2011]); Forst (2017); Forst, Hartmann, Jaeggi, and 
Saar (2009); Haugaard and Kettner (2020); Susen (2018a), esp. pp. 4, 
11–12, 13–14, 26–27, 28, 31, and 33n57.
25 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. xv.
26 Ibid., p. xv (italics in original) (quotation modified).
27 Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original).
28 Ibid., p. 3.
29 See ibid., p. 3.
30 Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original). Cf. Boltanski (2011 [2009]), pp. xi and 
57–61.
31 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 4.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
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entity or, when that entity is already known, to deter-
mine that entity’s intentions’33. In order for an event, as 
a singular happening, to acquire ‘full meaning’34, it has 
to be – rightly or wrongly – ‘related to an entity credited 
with an identity, a certain stability across time, and an 
intentionality’35. Irrespective of the question of whether 
intentional processes can, or cannot, be attributed to 
both conscious and non-conscious beings and mecha-
nisms36, an event obtains meaning insofar as its very 
occurrence can be brought into connection with a given 
entity and, more broadly, be explained in terms of spe-
cific ‘reasons behind it’37.
CONSPIRACIES
Conspiracies enter the stage of history as focal points 
‘for suspicions about the exercise of power’38. The two 
central questions posed by conspiracy theorists are as 
follows: (a) Where does power really lie? (b) Who really 
holds and exerts power?39 In response to these funda-
mental questions, one may seek to locate power in dif-
ferent spheres of society: the state, the government, the 
economy, the banks, the media, and/or specific social 
groups. When aiming to associate the location, posses-
sion, and exercise of power with particular social groups, 
one may classify these according to different sociologi-
cal variables: class, profession, ethnicity, ‘race’, culture, 
nationality, language, sex, gender, sexual orientation, 
age, and/or (dis-)ability – to mention only a few. 
On the basis of such a multidimensional and inter-
sectional perspective, one may differentiate key types of 
power: social, economic, political, ideological, cultural, 
judicial, educational, religious, spiritual, emotional, 
rational, mental, intellectual, physical, sexual, charis-
matic, linguistic, rhetorical, epistemic, scientific, techno-
logical, military, and so on. Furthermore, one may iden-
tify key dichotomies of power: ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, 
‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, and ‘power for’ vs. ‘power 
against’40.
The crucial point in conspiracy theories, however, is 
to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, a ‘sur-
33 Ibid., p. 4 (italics in original).
34 Ibid., p. 4.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
36 On this point, see, for instance, Dennett (1987). See also Boltanski 
(2014 [2012]), p. 275n3. Cf. Susen (2020a), pp. 10–13, 29–30, 150, and 
182.
37 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 4.
38 Ibid., p. xv (italics added).
39 See ibid., p. xv.
40 See Susen (2018a), esp. pp. 5–7. See also Susen (2014b).
face reality’41, which is ‘apparent but probably illusory 
even though it has an official status’42, and, on the other 
and, a ‘deep, hidden, threatening reality’43, which, while 
remaining largely or completely unofficial, is ‘much 
more real’44 than its epiphenomenal counterpart, which 
is designed to conceal it. The tension, if not conflict, 
between these two realities is expressed in the fact that 
they tend to be at odds with each other, leading – in Bol-
tanskian terms – to the ‘REALITY vs. reality’45 antino-
my, which serves as the guiding thread of his analysis.
The conspiracy form implies the suspicion that an 
event may be linked to an individual or collective enti-
ty – that is, usually a group of people – responsible for 
a development taking place in reality, but outside the 
boundaries of normality. A conspiracy is, by definition, 
‘perceived as such – as distinguished from ordinary 
human relations – from the outside’46. Conspiracies are 
supposed to be laid bare through systematic operations 
of unveiling. In this sense, conspiracy theories hinge 
upon a distinction between ‘an apparent but fictitious 
reality’47 and ‘a hidden but real reality’48. In light of this 
binary categorization, conspiracy theories follow the 
modern-day spirit of dévoilement – that is, the mission 
of uncovering, unmasking, unearthing, revealing, dis-
closing, and exposing mostly or entirely concealed, but 
nonetheless substantial, aspects of reality, which escape 
people’s common-sense perceptions, conceptions, and 
interpretations of the world. Conspiracy theories are 
based on ‘big claims’ insofar as they purport to cast light 
on the noumenal realm, composed of entities capable of 
triggering certain events within the sphere of ‘real real-
ity’ without being inferable by, let alone knowable to, 
ordinary actors, who remain caught in, and seemingly 
dependent upon, the appearances of the phenomenal 
realm, which manifests itself in the construction of a 
‘fictitious reality’.
Thus reality, social reality as initially perceived by a naïve 
observer (and reader), with its order, its hierarchies, and 
its principles of causality, reverses itself and unveils its 
fictional nature, revealing another much more real reality 
that it had been concealing. This second reality is inhabit-
ed by things, acts, actors, levels, connections and especial-
ly powers whose existence, indeed, whose very possibility, 
had not been suspected by anyone.49
41 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. xv (italics added).
42 Ibid., p. xv.
43 Ibid., p. xv (italics added).
44 Ibid., p. xv.
45 Ibid., p. xv (italics in original). See ibid., Chapter 1.
46 Ibid., p. 13.
47 Ibid., p. 13 (italics added).
48 Ibid., p. 13 (italics added).
49 Ibid., pp. 13–14 (italics added) (punctuation modified).
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Conspiracy theories – and, in parallel, inquiries 
based on suspicion – claim to be capable of identifying, 
examining, and explaining once and for all ‘the causal 
determinations that forge reality’50. Similar not only 
to detective fiction and spy fiction but also to sociolo-
gies of suspicion, in conspiracy theories hidden pow-
ers, and those who possess and exert these powers in 
an obscure and unaccountable fashion, are allegedly 
being exposed. Through this uncovering process, con-
spiracy theories seek to redefine ‘the whatness of what 
is’51 – that is, to replace ‘the whatness of what appears 
to be the case’ with ‘the whatness of what is the case’, 
thereby ostensibly grasping ‘the reality of reality’52. 
Paradoxically, the pseudoscientific underpinnings of 
conspiracy theories are both antithetical and comple-
mentary to the modern quest for scientific discovery. 
Weltanschauungen der Enthüllung enthüllen den Welt-
geist der Enthüllung.53
INQUIRIES
Before elaborating on the various dimensions 
attached to their sine qua non role in the social scienc-
es, let us – at this point – briefly consider at least some 
basic aspects of inquiries. In a general sense, ‘inquiries’ 
designate investigative processes concerned with ask-
ing questions and/or seeking information about some-
one or something. In the social sciences, ‘ inquiries’ may 
be defined as terminologically precise, epistemologically 
reflexive, conceptually sophisticated, methodologically 
rigorous, and empirically substantiated investigations 
aimed at describing, analysing, interpreting, explain-
ing, and – if desired – making judgements about par-
ticular aspects of reality in a systematic fashion. Insofar 
as they are inspired by ‘ontologically strong’ – notably 
positivist, functionalist, and/or determinist – con-
ceptions of the world, scientific inquiries tend to be 
motivated by the ambition to uncover the underlying 
mechanisms, structures, and forces that are believed 
to shape, if not to govern, the constitution and devel-
opment of reality, or particular aspects of reality, in a 
fundamental manner.
50 Ibid., p. 14.
51 Ibid., p. 14 (italics in original).
52 Ibid., p. 15 (italics in original).
53 This sentence may be roughly translated as follows: Worldviews of 
disclosure disclose the world spirit of disclosure. Or, alternatively: World-
views of revelation reveal the world spirit of revelation.
‘THE WORLD’ AND ‘REALITY’
Exploring the relationship between mysteries, con-
spiracies, and inquiries in modern societies, Boltanski 
insists on the historical significance of ‘the foundation-
al ties that link the apparatus of state power with this 
apparatus of knowledge’54. This issue poses ‘the question 
of social causality’55 – notably with respect to the con-
nection between entities and events in the construction 
of human reality. In this regard, Boltanski’s distinction 
between ‘the world ’ and ‘reality’ is crucial.56 The for-
mer designates ‘everything that happens’57: in a Witt-
gensteinian sense, it is everything that is the case; in a 
Boltanskian sense, it is everything that is the case as a 
product of previous occurrences that unfold ‘in a spo-
radic and ontologically uncontrollable fashion’58. The 
latter refers to ‘a network of causalities based on pre-
established formats that make action predictable’59 and, 
consequently, allow for the emergence of relatively stable 
and solidified modes of sociality. 
To be clear, ‘the world’ and ‘reality’ – understood 
in this way – are intimately interrelated. The latter is 
founded on ‘a selection and an organization of cer-
tain possibilities offered by’60 the former. At the same 
time, the former is shaped by both the material and the 
symbolic constructions generated by both the subjec-
tive and the normative components of the latter. Every 
time ‘the world’ and ‘reality’ are out of sync to a degree 
that becomes objectively, normatively, and subjectively 
unsustainable, actors experience a crisis situation: the 
representations, interpretations, and expectations held 
by inhabitants of the latter have to be re-adjusted to 
meet the practical requirements and constraints [Sach-
zwänge] imposed upon their lives by the ineluctable 
ontological preponderance of the former. 
Crucially, however, ‘the world’ comprises not only 
‘everything that happens’61 but also ‘everything that 
might possibly happen’62 and, hence, ‘an “everything” 
that cannot be fully known and mastered’63. In this 
sense, it reflects an immediately accessible horizon of the 
present and an emerging horizon of the future, a dis-
54 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. xvii.
55 Ibid., p. xvii.
56 See ibid., p. xvii. See also Boltanski (2011 [2009]), esp. pp. xi and 
57–61. In addition, see, for instance: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen 
(2014 [2010]), pp. 597 and 602–606; Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 175 and 
184–185.
57 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 3. See also ibid., p. xvii.
58 Ibid., p. xvii.
59 Ibid., p. xvii. See also ibid., p. 3.
60 Ibid., p. xvii.
61 Ibid., p. 3. See also ibid., p. xvii.
62 Ibid., p. 3.
63 Ibid., p. 3.
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cernible realm of actuality and a latent realm of potenti-
ality, a sphere of availability and controllability [Verfüg-
barkeit] and a sphere unavailability and uncontrollability 
[Unverfügbarkeit].64 
The main function of ‘reality’, by contrast, is to pro-
vide a socially constructed sphere of ‘pre-established for-
mats […] sustained by institutions’65 of different kinds. 
Some of these institutional arrangements have ‘a legal 
or paralegal character’66, especially in Western socie-
ties. Most importantly, however, the formats upon which 
the social construction of ‘reality’ is contingent ‘con-
stitute a semantics that expresses the whatness of what 
is’67. As such, they make available a treasure of collec-
tively shared meanings, permitting actors to ‘establish 
qualifications’68, to ‘define entities and trials’69, as well 
as to carry out proofs and tests [épreuves]. The interplay 
between entités, événements, qualifications, and épreuves 
is the key dynamic that – provided it contains the poten-
tial for socio-ontological attunement, as the subjacent 
telos inherent in the ineluctable confluence of structural 
and agential forces in the construction of human forms 
of life – can give normatively codified constellations a 
certain degree of legitimacy from the point of view of 
those involved in the construction of ‘reality’. Given its 
structuring and meaning-donating function, ‘reality’ 
allows for the emergence of ‘a network of causal relations 
that holds together the events with which experience is 
confronted’70. It bestows actors with a sense of stability, 
solidity, and predictability, while they find themselves 
immersed in the world-laden experience of ontological 
instability, fragility, and unpredictability:
Reference to these relations makes it possible to give 
meaning to the events that are produced by identifying the 
entities to which these events must be attributed.71
The social construction of ‘reality’, in other words, is 
inconceivable without the everyday projection of mean-
ing upon the alleged relationship between the occurring 
of events and the presence of entities in ‘the world’. The 
causal relations permeating the construction of ‘reality’ 
are ‘tacitly recognized in general as unproblematic’72. 
Their legitimacy tends to be taken for granted and to 
remain unchallenged. In crisis situations, however, ‘the 
64 Cf. Rosa (2020 [2018]).
65 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 3.
66 Ibid., p. 3.
67 Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original).
68 Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original).
69 Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original).
70 Ibid., p. 3 (italics added).
71 Ibid., pp. 3–4 (italics in original).
72 Ibid., p. 4.
trust placed in the validity of the established formats’73 
can be called into question by virtue of tests [épreuves]. 
In this sense, the relationship between ‘the world’ and 
‘reality’ is constantly being redefined by the interplay 
between, on the one hand, the objectivity of everything 
that happens and, on the other hand, the normativity 
and subjectivity of everything that is being socially codi-
fied and individually experienced.
‘THE REAL’ VS. ‘REALITY’
Boltanski distinguishes between ‘the real ’ and 
‘reality’:74
He employs the concept of ‘the real’ to emphasize 
the ‘circumstantial and singular character’75 of ‘real enti-
ties and states of affairs’76. By definition, these remain 
‘attached to the particular events through which they 
manifest themselves and to the situations that these 
events bring about’77. On this view, real things are tied 
to events, while different situations generate ‘different, 
and often incompatible or contradictory, real things’78. 
We are confronted, then, with the intertwinement of, 
on the one hand, real entities and things (that is, subjects 
and objects) and, on the other hand, events and situa-
tions.
Boltanski uses the concept of ‘reality’ to stress the 
existence of ‘regularities that are maintained no matter 
what situation is envisaged and that frame each event’79 
irrespective of its (alleged or confirmed) singular-
ity. Owing to their defining power, regularities permit 
both observers and participants ‘to trace the boundary 
between the possible and the impossible’80. In any real-
ity, the conditions of possibility delineate the conditions 
of impossibility, allowing for the possibility of some, and 
the impossibility of other, conditions of (im-)possibility. 
In terms of their functional value, regularities provide ‘a 
general framework for action’81 that, due to its structural 
constitution, makes possible a certain degree of stabil-
ity, solidity, and predictability, thereby contributing to 
the emergence of ‘a certain order’82. The whole point of 
inquiries – regardless of whether these are ordinary, sci-
entific, or fictional – is that they endeavour to uncover 
73 Ibid., p. 4.
74 See ibid., pp. 9–11.
75 Ibid., p. 9 (italics added).
76 Ibid., p. 9.
77 Ibid., p. 9 (italics in original).
78 Ibid., p. 9.
79 Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
80 Ibid., p. 10.
81 Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
82 Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
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the workings of ‘reality in itself ’83 – that is, of a noume-
nal level of existence that, effectively, fulfils the ontologi-
cal function of ‘a substratum for the various situations 
confronted by the action, independent of the “subjective” 
interpretations developed by the actors’84. The key com-
ponents of this reality possess ‘an all-encompassing char-
acter’85, allowing for the existence of ‘a relatively coher-
ent whole’86, in which all particular elements – including 
irregular, deviant, and mysterious ones – are embedded. 
Mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries acquire attentional 
currency against this taken-for-granted background of 
reality.
In summary: ‘The real ’ refers to the ‘phenomenal 
level’ of existence, which is not only infused with nor-
mativity and subjectivity, but also characterized by 
varying degrees of circumstantiality, singularity, and 
contingency. ‘Reality’ designates the ‘noumenal level’ of 
existence, which is constituted by underlying elements of 
objectivity and, consequently, marked by high degrees of 
regularity, constancy, and predictability.
The concept of ‘reality’ may be differentiated fur-
ther by drawing a distinction between ‘physical real-
ity’ and ‘social reality’.87 These two kinds of reality are 
ontologically interconnected and, arguably, the bounda-
ries between them are increasingly (and, possibly, have 
always been) blurred.88 Both of them play a pivotal 
role in ordinary, scientific, and fictional inquiries. An 
inquiry may be undertaken by ordinary actors in their 
everyday lives, by trained researchers in expert-led pro-
jects, or by detectives or spies in novels (or, indeed, by 
police officers in criminal investigations, by judges in 
court rooms, or by specialists in other contexts). In most 
cases, the search for ‘evidence’ will depend on scrutiniz-
ing relevant elements from both ‘physical reality’ and 
‘social reality’. It remains an open question whether or 
not both types of reality are governed by underlying 
‘laws’: from a positivist point of view, the answer is ‘yes’; 
from an interpretivist point of view, the answer is ‘no’. 
Notwithstanding the lawfulness or lawlessness of dif-
ferent spheres of existence, the ontological distinction 
between ‘natural reality’ and ‘social reality’ is reflected 
in the methodological distinction between research strat-
egies in the natural sciences and research strategies in 
the social sciences.89
83 Ibid., p. 10 (italics in original).
84 Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
85 Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
86 Ibid., p. 10.
87 See ibid., p. 10.
88 Cf. Thomas (1998). On this point, cf. Susen (2020b).
89 See Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 176–182, 184, 185, 193, and 200n35.
INTERESTS, INTENTIONS, AND STRATEGIES
Arguably, one feature that ‘the sociology of suspi-
cion’, ‘conspiracy theories’, and ‘paranoia’ share is their 
reliance on the ‘intentionalist hypothesis’.90 According 
to this hypothesis, a particular set of human actions can 
be deduced from, if not reduced to, ‘a conscious (but 
preferably hidden, thus malevolent) intention’91. On this 
view, causality can be subsumed under intentionality. 
In socially stratified scenarios characterized by strug-
gles for power and influence, ‘behind every effect there 
is a hidden strategy that is dissimulated so as to maxi-
mize a personal interest’92 and/or a group-specific inter-
est. These interests, or sets of interests, may be based on 
class, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, 
age, ability/disability, and/or any other key sociologi-
cal variable. On this account, actors possess and pursue 
both individual and collective (a) interests, (b) intentions, 
and (c) strategies, which motivate them towards devel-
oping and following particular patterns of functioning 
and, eventually, towards embarking on certain courses 
of action.
Even if one questions their validity, intentionalist 
accounts raise a number of important questions, in par-
ticular in relation to ‘the access that human beings have 
to their own inner lives’93 and the degree to which they 
are able to justify their actions. It is part of the critical 
mission of large parts of modern sociology to call the 
motives people provide for their actions into question 
and to avoid regarding them as the real reasons for their 
actions.94 Instead of taking their narratives at face value, 
critical sociologists will examine, and possibly doubt, 
their cogency and persuasiveness. To be sure, people 
may be perfectly sincere when giving reasons for their 
beliefs, values, and actions. It is the task of the critical 
sociologist, however, to expose the extent to which ordi-
nary perceptions, conceptions, and interpretations are 
based on misperceptions, misconceptions, and misinter-
pretations.
Not dissimilar to ‘real’ life, in detective stories and 
spy stories, the actors – notably those rightly or wrongly 
classified as ‘criminals’ or ‘spies’ – ‘either act strategi-
cally and know what they are doing, or else – when they 
are unaware of the real purposes of their actions – […] 
deceive themselves because they have been deliberately 
deceived or “manipulated” by others’95. Epistemically, 
90 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 224.
91 Heinich (2009), p. 35. Cited in Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 225.
92 Heinich (2009), p. 35 (italics added). Cited in Boltanski (2014 [2012]), 
p. 225.
93 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 225.
94 See ibid., p. 225.
95 Ibid., pp. 225–226 (italics added).
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this tension-laden situation may be described in terms of 
several dichotomies: conscious vs. unconscious, deliber-
ate vs. accidental, autonomous vs. heteronomous, endog-
enous vs. exogenous – to mention only a few. The issue 
of ‘suspicion’ arises insofar as the social scientist, the 
detective, and the spy seek to shed light on the reasons 
behind an action – including the extent to which it was 
performed in a conscious or unconscious, deliberate or 
accidental, autonomous or heteronomous, endogenous or 
exogenous fashion. 
This implies that, paradoxically, ordinary actors 
have to be taken seriously and not to be taken serious-
ly. When taken seriously, they are depicted as entities 
equipped with critical, reflective, and moral capacities. 
When not taken seriously, they are portrayed as entities 
largely unaware of the structural forces by which their 
actions – and, by implication, the resources of their dis-
positional apparatus – are governed, if not determined. 
Either way, they are regarded with suspicion because, 
irrespective of whether they fall into the former or the 
latter category, the true reasons behind their actions are 
hidden beneath the performative veil of both their public 
‘frontstage’ and their private ‘backstage’.96 If suspicion 
lies at the core not only of crime novels and spy nov-
els but also of the social sciences (above all, sociology), 
then it reflects a concern that generates a profound cri-
sis – namely, a crisis ‘in the transparent reality that the 
modern nation-state claims to guarantee’97. In a more 
fundamental sense, however, it results in the binary con-
struction of a reality: on the one hand, an apparent and 
accessible but fictitious, deceptive, and misleading real-
ity; on the other hand, a hidden and underlying but real, 
authentic, and potentially threatening reality. 
CAUSALITY AND CAUSALITIES
It is far from clear to what extent sociology can (or 
cannot) attribute different degrees of causality to the 
relationship between events and entities in the construc-
tion of reality. Crucial in this respect is the distinc-
tion between methodological individualism and social 
holism.98 The former tends to explain events by refer-
ence to actions performed by individual entities, capable 
of engaging with and attributing meaning to the world 
by virtue of normatively mediated and subjectively moti-
96 See Goffman (1971 [1959]). See also Susen (2016d).
97 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 226.
98 See, for example: Brown (1987); Bulle (2019); Bulle and Phan (2017); 
Efaw (1994); Herfeld (2018); Ingram (1976); Jacobs (1983); Lukes 
(1973); O’Neill (1992 [1973]); Kincaid (2016); Ramström (2018); Steel 
(2006); Szmatka (1989); Tilley (1982); Tilley (1984); Wettersten (1999); 
Zahle (2003).
vated interventions. The latter tends to explain events by 
reference to actions performed by collective entities, capa-
ble of organizing the structural and agential components 
of reality as a whole, including the actions carried out 
by individuals situated within it. One of the main rea-
sons sociology has never been able to ignore, let alone to 
abandon, the ambition to provide ‘proof of causal rela-
tions’99 shaping the composition of the social universe is 
that most of its advocates continue to demand their dis-
cipline ‘be recognized as a science’100. 
Granted, several approaches within sociology have 
questioned the ‘scientific ambition’ of the discipline, 
positing that its epistemic underpinnings may be weak-
ened by different forms of implicit or unconscious bias. 
Among the most influential perspectives articulating 
this kind of criticism are social constructivism, intersec-
tionalism, feminism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, 
and postcolonialism. To this list one may add micro-
sociological and interpretive (or interpretivist) frame-
works – such as symbolic interactionism, ethnometh-
odology, existential(ist) sociology, social phenomenol-
ogy, and hermeneutics. Last but not least, Boltanski’s 
attempt to develop a research programme known as 
‘the pragmatic sociology of critique’ is, to a large extent, 
motivated by the desire to overcome the shortcomings 
of Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, especially with respect 
to the accusation that his ‘genetic structuralism’ suffers 
from a noticeable degree of social determinism and, by 
implication, socio-ontological fatalism.101 None of these 
(or any other major) trends and developments in the dis-
cipline, however, have undermined the scientific spirit 
permeating sociology. It is no accident, then, that soci-
ology continues to be classified as a social science.102 In 
fact, given its commitment to conceiving of human real-
ity as an essentially social state of affairs, sociology may 
be regarded as the foundational discipline of the social 
sciences par excellence.
The scientific spirit of the discipline may be illustrat-
ed by reference to both micro- and macro-sociological 
approaches. If, for instance, sociology decides to embrace 
psychology as its main disciplinary partner, then its prin-
cipal objects of study will be individuals, including the 
motives and intentions that undergird their actions.103 
Even if it goes down this path, however, sociology must 
continue to examine the role of ‘entities of larger size and 
greater stability that are not persons properly speaking’104 
99 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 227.
100 Ibid., p. 227.
101 On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2007), Chapter 8.
102 Cf. Susen (2011c).
103 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 227.
104 Ibid., p. 227.
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and yet influence their lives in a profound manner. By 
contrast, if, for example, sociology decides to embrace 
history and geography as its chief disciplinary allies, then 
its thematic focus will be on ‘objects of great size’105 – 
such as social systems, institutions, economies, polities, 
nation-states, empires, populations, regions, and conti-
nents. These might – or, indeed, should – be examined 
over extensive periods of time and by virtue of compar-
ative-historical research. More generally, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for sociologists to make informed judge-
ments about key variables relevant to their discipline, 
unless they take into account the role of collective enti-
ties and structural forces.106
Sociologists, in order to provide explanations about 
the social world, need to be committed to undertaking 
several key operations: (a) identifying and classifying 
events; (b) relating these events to one another; (c) iden-
tifying and classifying entities; (d) relating these entities 
to one another; (e) establishing a relationship between 
these entities and events in a more or less systematic 
fashion; (f) attributing the occurrence of a particular 
event to the action performed by a given entity.107
Far from representing a procedural privilege monop-
olized by sociologists, however, these operations are 
remarkably similar to those carried out by ‘ordinary per-
sons’ in their everyday lives, especially when confronted 
with situations characterized by high degrees of uncer-
tainty, which may result in specific forms of crisis.108 To a 
greater or lesser extent, ‘ordinary persons’ are required to 
draw upon their epistemic capacities when coping with, 
and attaching meaning to, the challenges thrown at them 
in the course of their daily lives. This task involves iden-
tifying and classifying events and entities as well as, cru-
cially, seeking to explain the occurrence of the former in 
terms of actions performed by the latter. Similar to the 
complementary functions of empirical research and theo-
retical system-building in sociology, everyday life com-
prises a ‘constant back-and-forth movement […] between 
what can be known through experience and what can 
only be known in a mediated fashion’109, between the 
seemingly direct access we gain to the world by virtue of 
our senses and the indirect ways of obtaining knowledge 
about the world by virtue of reason and logic. 
The more terminologically precise, epistemologi-
cally reflexive, conceptually sophisticated, methodologi-
cally rigorous, and empirically substantiated sociologi-
cal inquiries can claim to be, the more they distinguish 
105 Ibid., p. 228.
106 See ibid., p. 228.
107 See ibid., p. 229.
108 See ibid., p. 229.
109 Ibid., p. 229 (italics added).
themselves from the sphere of common-sense knowledge 
generated, and relied upon, by ordinary actors in their 
everyday lives. And yet, sociology cannot, and should 
not aim to, distance itself entirely from, let alone tran-
scend, its principal object of study: society. If it sought 
to do so and, by implication, endeavoured to ‘forge a 
language that would be exclusively its own’110, it would 
risk embarking on a project whose fruits would become 
‘unintelligible’111 to the wider public and to neigh-
bouring disciplines. As is often pointed out under the 
rubric ‘reflexivity’112, sociological discourse is not con-
fined to the ivory towers of the university. Inevitably, ‘it 
rebounds into the everyday world, especially through 
the intermediary of political decisions that draw their 
authority from the opinions of “experts” ’113, includ-
ing social scientists. This is, without a doubt, the case 
in contemporary society, in which – as an expression of 
‘reflexive modernity’114 – the boundaries between ordi-
nary knowledge and scientific knowledge appear to be 
increasingly blurred.115
The blurring of traditional epistemic lines of demar-
cation has always been part of the social sciences, as 
illustrated in ‘the inevitable proximity between ordinary 
intrigues and sociological explanations, and between 
events and the entities that are the focal points in each 
case’116. The proximity is a sign of ‘shameful promiscui-
ty’117, in the sense that it shifts the boundaries between 
science and non-science, between the (external) perspec-
tive of the observer and the (internal) perspective of the 
participant. The issue of this curious proximity raises a 
central question: 
[…] if the most notorious sign by which persons accused 
of paranoia are recognized is the fact that they attribute 
historical or personal events to the action of large-scale 
entities, on which they confer a sort of intentionality and 
110 Ibid., p. 230.
111 Ibid., p. 230.
112 On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2007), esp. Chapter 5; Susen 
(2011a); Susen (2016a).
113 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 230.
114 See, for instance: Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994); Beck and Lau 
(2005), esp. pp. 550–555; Kyung-Sup (2010); Susen (2015a), esp. pp. 
143–145 and 238–239.
115 On the distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowl-
edge’, see, for example: Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1998), esp. pp. 
248–251; Boltanski (1999–2000), esp. pp. 303–306; Bourdieu and Eagle-
ton (1992), esp. p. 117; Celikates (2009), esp. pp. 12, 25–28, 39–40, 
56, 72–81, 89–92, 116–122, 138–152, 159–160, and 187–247; Cronin 
(1997), esp. pp. 206–207; Mesny (1998), esp. pp. 143–190; Susen (2007), 
esp. pp. 25, 102, 135–137, 138, 139, 140, 146 n. 8, 153, 156, 157, 204, 
205, 224, and 311; Susen (2011b), esp. pp. 448–458; Susen (2011a), pp. 
8, 27, 33–36, and 40; Susen (2012b), pp. 713–715; Susen (2015a), esp. 
pp. 7 and 282–283n30.
116 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 230 (italics added).
117 Ibid., p. 230.
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capacity for action, how could we manage to keep similar 
accusations from being addressed to sociologists?118
Indeed, there are striking similarities between, on the 
one hand, the narratives constructed by ordinary actors 
in relation to alleged mysteries and conspiracies and, on 
the other hand, the explanatory frameworks designed by 
sociologists to shed light on the underlying factors shap-
ing, if not determining, social realities. All attempts to 
uncover mysteries, conspiracies, or hidden social causali-
ties are motivated by the ambition to expose sets of sub-
jacent links between events, taking place in society, and 
entities, equipped with different degrees of intentionality. 
To be clear, ‘intentionality’ may be attributed to individu-
al actors (notably powerful ones), collective actors (notably 
those defined by key sociological variables – such as class, 
profession, ethnicity, ‘race’, culture, nationality, language, 
sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, and ability/disability), 
and social structures (notably economic, technological, 
political, cultural, ideological, linguistic, institutional, and 
civilizational ones). Regardless of whether intentional-
ity is an expression of individual or collective, human or 
non-human, tangible or intangible forms of agency, the 
presumption of its existence is essential to all investigative 
projects concerned with uncovering mysteries, conspira-
cies, and/or hidden social causalities.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, 
AND NARRATIVE ENTITIES
The relation between sociology and law is reveal-
ing in that one major commonality between the two is 
their interest in regulatory arrangements put in place to 
provide social life with viable degrees of stability, solid-
ity, and predictability.119 Human actors can be regard-
ed as responsible and accountable entities, capable not 
only of meeting certain basic expectations, but also of 
being socially and/or legally sanctioned for failing to do 
so.120 Similar to implicit or explicit normative agendas 
attached to social roles, laws and legally binding rules 
‘specify the set of events that can be expected from these 
entities’121 and, crucially, those that cannot, or must not, 
be expected from them.
Unlike social roles, however, legally defined roles 
leave hardly any room for ambiguity. From a judicial 
point of view, ‘an individual does not belong more or 
118 Ibid., p. 230 (italics added).
119 See ibid., pp. 230–234.
120 See ibid., p. 231.
121 Ibid., p. 231 (italics in original).
less to an entity’122 – for instance, to a state, organiza-
tion, association, foundation, corporation, or institution. 
From a sociological perspective, by contrast, it is obvi-
ous that individuals may participate to different degrees 
in the running of these entities. Unlike social roles (most 
of which are characterized by high degrees of flexibility 
and contingency), legally defined entities possess ‘clear 
contours’123, remits, and missions. Within their nor-
mative universe, membership relations are ‘governed 
by explicit rules of incompatibility, by prohibitions on 
“double dipping” ’124, especially with regard to the possi-
bility of obtaining benefits, advantages, or income from 
different sources in illicit – that is, morally objection-
able, procedurally problematic, and legally punishable 
– ways. The importance of the social functions of law, 
especially in terms of its capacity to contribute to the 
normative stabilization of reality, can hardly be over-
stated:
Law […] plays an essential role in the processes that sta-
bilize reality. It helps make reality at once intelligible and 
predictable by pre-forming causal chains that can be acti-
vated to interpret events that occur. Obliged to link events 
to entities, the legal system has to have at its disposal an 
encyclopedia of entities that it recognizes as valid. It is the 
law’s responsibility […] to express the whatness of what is 
and to associate these judgements about being with judge-
ments of value.125
Hence, from a sociological point of view, law serves 
several key social functions: (a) to stabilize and to solid-
ify reality; (b) to make reality relatively predictable; (c) 
to make reality intelligible and meaningful, not only to 
legal experts but also, more fundamentally, to ordinary 
actors, navigating social life within the limits set by 
normatively codified boundaries; (d) to establish con-
ceptual and empirical links between events and entities; 
(e) to cross-fertilize judicial notions of legality, epis-
temic notions of validity, and socio-political notions of 
legitimacy; (f) to place the principles of responsibility 
and accountability at the heart of human agency; (g) to 
determine the relationship between ‘facts’ and ‘values’; 
(h) to define both ‘the what’ and ‘the how’ – and, thus, 
the conditions of possibility – of the social fabric.
The overlap between legal and sociological interpre-
tations of entities, however, comes at a significant cost. 
The construction of legally defined entities hinges on ‘a 
sort of tacit shifting back and forth between “moral per-
122 Ibid., p. 231 (italics in original).
123 Ibid., p. 232.
124 Ibid., p. 232.
125 Ibid., p. 232 (italics added; ‘express the whatness of what is’ is itali-
cized in the original).
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sons” and “physical persons” ’126. The construction of 
sociologically defined entities depends on a kind of latent 
conceptual commute between ‘social actors’ and ‘embod-
ied actors’. Yet, both in legal discourses and in socio-
logical discourses, it is highly uncommon to portray, let 
alone to conceptualize, entities in terms of ‘uncertain 
persons’ or ‘uncertain actors’ – that is, as beings ‘that 
do not constitute clearly defined sets’127. In ordinary dis-
courses, by contrast, references to undefined and inde-
terminate entities of this seemingly ‘atypical type’ are 
rather frequent, ‘especially in situations of utterance that 
have a private character’128 and, more generally, in every-
day story-telling practices. Hence, these entities may be 
classified as ‘narrative entities’129. 
If sociologists (and, more broadly, social scientists) 
construct, endorse, and rely on conceptual ‘schemas in 
which only already recognized entities appear’130, then 
they are in danger of ‘merging with the fields of law or 
business administration and generating doubts about the 
added value of [their] contributions’131. If so, sociology 
risks not only losing its intellectual autonomy and insti-
tutional identity132 but also, more importantly, its capac-
ity to grasp the social world in a truly enlightening and 
original manner.
Sociology’s critical mission, however, consists not 
only in exploring uncertain, or hitherto undefined, enti-
ties and actors. In addition, it involves the task of expos-
ing the extent to which ‘the official character of certain 
entities conceals reality while appearing to describe 
it’133, similar to the camera obscura effect inherent in the 
misrepresentations and distortions generated by domi-
nant ideologies.134 This issue is reflected in the fact that, 
in many cases, the contours of official entities do not 
coincide with those of existing entities. If they are out 
of sync, sociologists must ‘forge their own entities and 
establish their validity with the means of inquiry at their 
126 Ibid., p. 233.
127 Ibid., p. 233 (italics added).
128 Ibid., p. 233.
129 See ibid., pp. 233–334 and 251.
130 Ibid., p. 233.
131 Ibid., p. 233.
132 Cf. Susen (2020a), esp. pp. xxi, xxii, 3, 213, 220, 227, 228, 261, 262, 
270, 325, 347, and 349.
133 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 234.
134 See, for instance: Susen (2014d); Susen (2016b); Susen (2015a), 
esp. Chapter 2 (section iii). On the ‘dominant ideology thesis’, see, for 
instance: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980); Abercrombie, Hill, 
and Turner (1990); Boltanski (2008); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); 
Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Browne and Susen (2014); Con-
de-Costas (1991); Eagleton (2006 [1976]); Eagleton (2007 [1991]); Hol-
loway and Susen (2013); Larrain (1991 [1983]); Marx and Engels (1953 
[1845–1847]); Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]); Rehmann (2004); 
Reitz (2004); Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2012a); Susen 
(2014a); Weber (1995); Žižek (1989); Žižek (1994).
disposal’135, whether these are based on quantitative or 
qualitative methods (or a combination of both). When 
this process is successful, a discipline’s nascent terminol-
ogy is tantamount to an ‘emergent property’136 – that is, 
it takes on a life of its own. The appearance of a specifi-
cally sociological vocabulary may make the evolutionary 
leap to disciplinary consciousness and, subsequently, to 
social consciousness, confirming that some of its jargon 
and nomenclature may be converted into naturalized 
elements of ordinary language. 
This process tends to confer a real and undeniable exist-
ence on the entities in question, in a way, since the actors 
themselves eventually use the terms and recognize them-
selves in the sociological descriptions […].137
When this happens, sociology switches from an 
‘about-and-above-society mode’ to a ‘within-and-
through-society mode’. Following this transition, its 
conceptual toolkits are no longer merely epistemic 
devices but, rather, acquire an empirical function: they 
are incorporated into everyday discourses and prac-
tices. In this case, the ‘sociologist’s construction of the 
object’138 – far from being reducible to an abstract com-
ponent of his or her terminology, epistemology, or meth-
odology – becomes part of everyday reality and, thus, of 
the empirically constituted ontology known as human 
agency.
THE SUSPICIONS AND SUPERSTITIONS OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES
In a well-known lecture delivered in 1948139, Karl 
Popper addressed two key issues: (a) the role of enti-
ties in sociological analysis and (b) the role of conspira-
cies in social and political history.140 In essence, Pop-
per was highly critical of ‘sociological conspiracy theo-
ries’141, which he associated with those approaches in 
the humanities and social sciences that, in one way or 
another, subscribed to the ‘intentionalist hypothesis’142. 
In a more general sense, Popper sought to defend a con-
ception of the social sciences that emphasized their ‘sci-
entific’ nature and their capacity to serve as a key instru-
135 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 234. Cf. De Cock and Nyberg (2016), pp. 
478–480.
136 See, for instance, Aziz-Alaoui and Bertelle (2009).
137 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 234.
138 Ibid., p. 234.
139 Popper (2002 [1948]).
140 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. 234–235.
141 Ibid., p. 235. Cf. Pigden (1995).
142 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 224.
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ment for ‘a rational politics’.143 At the core of this project 
lay Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’144, the antithesis of 
his ‘methodological naturalism’. The critique was based 
on three main assumptions: 
First, there is the opposition between holism and 
atomism, which, broadly speaking, is congruent with 
the distinction between social holism and methodological 
individualism.145 According to Popper’s account, scholars 
advocating a historicist position contend that ‘the objects 
of sociology, social groups, must never be regarded as 
mere aggregates of persons’146. From a holistic view-
point, ‘[t]he social group is more than the mere sum 
total of its members, and it is also more than the mere 
sum total of the merely personal relationships existing 
at any moment between any of its members’147. From 
this perspective, social groups possess and exert differ-
ent modes of power that transcend individual agency. 
On this interpretation, agency constitutes a property 
derived from and performed by the ‘organic whole’ of 
social groups, rather than individuals as isolated entities. 
In this sense, Popper conceives of ‘holism’ as a form of 
organicism.148
Second, there is the opposition between methodolog-
ical essentialism and methodological nominalism. In Pop-
per’s eyes, the latter has been introduced and employed 
‘so successfully in the natural sciences’149, whereas the 
former carries considerable weight in the social scienc-
es. According to Popper, methodological essentialism 
posits that ‘the task of social science is to understand 
and explain such sociological entities as the state, eco-
nomic action, the social group, etc., and that this can 
be done only by penetrating into their essences’150. Such 
an essentialist view is also universalist, in the sense that 
it ‘presupposes universal terms’151, which, by defini-
tion, ‘distinguish the essential from the accidental’152. 
143 See ibid., p. 224. See also, for instance: Popper (2002 [1948]); Pop-
per (2002 [1957]); Popper (2002 [1963]); Popper (2013 [1945]); Popper 
(1966 [1934]); Popper (2002 [1959/1934]). In addition, see, for example: 
Fuller (2004); Magee (1973); Passeron (2010 [2006]).
144 See Popper (2002 [1957]). See also, for example: Borghini (2015); 
Fuller (2004); Habermas (1987 [1968]); Jacobs (1983); Keaney (1997); 
Lefevre (1974); Magee (1973); Passeron (2010 [2006]); Ray (1979); Shaw 
(1971); Tilley (1982); Tilley (1984).
145 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 235.
146 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 15. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 235.
147 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 15 (italics in original). See Boltanski (2014 
[2012]), p. 235.
148 See Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 17. See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 
235.
149 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 26. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 235.
150 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 26 (italics added). See Boltanski (2014 
[2012]), pp. 235–236.
151 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 26 (italics added). See Boltanski (2014 
[2012]), pp. 235–236.
152 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 27. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
By contrast, methodological nominalism negates the 
existence of universals and abstract objects and, at the 
same time, affirms the existence of general or abstract 
terms and predicates. It regards as pointless the attempt 
to penetrate into the alleged essence of things, let alone 
of universals or abstract objects, maintaining that such 
endeavours result in reductive accounts of reality, which 
are motivated by the futile ambition to search for, and 
to identify, the ‘ultimate causes’153 of existence, including 
those of social life.154
Third, there is the opposition between determinist 
utopianism and anti-determinist realism. According to 
Popper, historicism remains trapped in the former, rather 
than the latter, insofar as it presupposes that ‘social sci-
ence can establish “laws” and general tendencies’155 and 
even uncover ‘the law of evolution’156 that permeates soci-
ety as a whole. To a large extent, the social sciences have 
endorsed this view, because they are expected to make 
substantial contributions to ‘social improvements’157 and 
‘civilizational progress’158. This grand vision of ‘holistic 
or Utopian engineering’159 – whose tangible, and argu-
ably detrimental, impact on modern history is reflected 
in the pursuit of metanarratives160 – ‘aims at remodelling 
the “whole of society” in accordance with a definite plan 
or blueprint’161. In this large-scale venture, the end justi-
fies the means. In opposition to this determinist utopian-
ism, there is a strategy based on anti-determinist realism: 
namely, ‘piecemeal social engineering’162, which stands 
for a much more realistic, modest, and case-by-case 
problem-solving approach. It is motivated by the convic-
tion that individual and collective actors learn from their 
mistakes and that, in accordance with this insight, step-
by-step progress is possible163 – but without counting on, 
let alone proselytizing utopian ideas about, macro-soci-
etal projects, blueprints, or metanarratives.
Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’ can be considered a 
direct attack on Marxism and fascism164, but also, in a 
153 Cf. Little (1998).
154 On the concept of ‘nominalism’, see, for example: Field (1980); Good-
man and Quine (1947); Gosselin (1990); Knuuttila (1988); Tooley 
(1999); Veatch (1954).
155 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
156 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 97. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
157 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 53. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
158 See, for instance: Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 4; Susen (2020a), esp. 
pp. xxii, 7, 9, 32, 84, 113, 115, 243, 353, 363, 402, and 437. See also 
Allen (2016). In addition, see Feenberg (2017) and Susen (2020c), esp. 
pp. 735–739, 744–745, 747, 748, 752–753, 757–758, and 763.
159 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 61. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
160 See Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 4. See also Susen (2016c) and Susen 
(2017b). Cf. Lyotard (1984 [1979]).
161 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 61. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
162 Popper (2002 [1957]), p. 58. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
163 For a critical overview, see Pinker (2011) and Pinker (2018).
164 Similar arguments (as well as important counterarguments) can be 
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broader sense, on Hegelianism (notably Hegel’s philoso-
phy of history).165 In Popper’s opinion, these approach-
es are guilty of endorsing doctrinal thinking, oriented 
towards the perilous and toxic temptation to make pre-
dictions, prophecies, and promises founded on seduc-
tive, but ultimately erroneous, teleological views of his-
tory.166 For Popper, this ‘historicist doctrine of the social 
sciences’167 was complemented by a ‘historicist doctrine 
of politics’168, according to which ‘the task of politics is 
to lessen the birthpangs of impending political devel-
opments’169 and, thus, to confer teleologically inspired 
meanings to social transformations. In Popper’s eyes, 
these historicist inclinations170 have colonized the social 
sciences not only through Hegelianism171 and Marx-
ism172 but also through John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian-
ism173 and Auguste Comte’s positivism174.
Historicism, then, is the belief in unavoidable, pre-
dictable, progressive, directional, and universal devel-
opments, indicative of underlying forces driving social 
evolution.175 For Popper, however, historicism is not ‘the 
sole enemy of rational social science’176. To his mind, 
the impact of the doctrine of ‘naïve collectivism’ – or, if 
one prefers, ‘social holism’ – on the social sciences has 
been equally detrimental. Instead of analysing social 
phenomena, including their collective behavioural and 
institutional expressions, ‘in terms of individuals and 
their actions and relations’177, such a holistic approach 
defines as its main object of inquiry the ‘behaviour of 
social wholes, such as groups, nations, classes, socie-
ties, cultures, civilizations, etc.’178. Arguably, this holis-
tic perspective overlooks the fact that, ultimately, there 
found in the famous Historikerstreit. See, for instance: Nolte (1977); 
Nolte (1987). See also, for example: Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]); 
Kienel (2007); Kronenberg (2008).
165 See, for instance: Hegel (1975 [1837]); Hegel (1977 [1807]); Hegel 
(1990 [1825–1826]); Hegel (1991 [1820]).
166 See, for instance: Popper (2013 [1945]); Popper (2002 [1948]); Pop-
per (2002 [1957]); Popper (2002 [1963]).
167 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236 (italics in original).
168 Ibid., p. 236 (italics in original).
169 Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 455. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 236.
170 See Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 455. See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), 
pp. 236–237.
171 See Hegel (1975 [1837]), Hegel (1977 [1807]), Hegel (1990 [1825–
1826]), and Hegel (1991 [1820]).
172 See Marx (2000/1977 [1844]), Marx (2000 [1845]), Marx (2000 
[1857–8]), Marx (2000 [1859]), Marx (2000/1977 [1867/1885/1894]), 
Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]), and Marx and Engels (1985 
[1848]).
173 See Mill (1989 [1869]) and Mill (2002). 
174 See Comte (2009 [1844/1865]) and Comte and Martineau (1853 
[1830–1842]).
175 See Susen (2015a), Chapter 4 (esp. pp. 136–139).
176 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 237.
177 Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 459. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 237.
178 Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 459. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 237.
are no social actions without individuals responsible for 
embarking on them and no social structures, including 
institutions, without individuals who construct them. 
To be clear, Popper was opposed to both crude forms 
of social holism (such as Vulgärmarxismus) and crude 
forms of methodological intentionalism (which may be 
described as Vulgärintentionalismus). In his view, both 
have an inherent tendency to advocate variants of con-
spiratorial thinking179, according to which ‘the principle 
of causality’180, which drives the development of social 
constellations, can be associated with powerful indi-
vidual or collective entities, capable of imposing their 
will and authority on the rest of society. Challenging 
both sources of ‘superstition’181, which falsely attribute 
the causes behind the emergence of social phenomena 
to all-controlling individual or collective entities, Pop-
per rejected both holism and intentionalism. The former 
is based on the belief in the existence of ‘wholes’, which 
are portrayed as ‘subjects of social action’182 – a property 
that, according to Popper, remains a privilege of individ-
uals and of individuals only. The latter is founded on the 
supposition that individuals, when acting in a sustained 
and co-ordinated fashion, are sufficiently powerful to 
bring about the emergence of social phenomena by vir-
tue of their intentions.
Popper discarded both positions, arguing that events 
could be attributed neither to individual entities nor to 
collective entities, possessing and exerting significant 
degrees of power. On his account, events are the result 
of ‘the fortuitous encounter of a multiplicity of individual 
actions in a hypothetical space constructed on the model 
of the market’183. In other words, in Popper’s opinion, 
events are irreducible to individual or collective entities; 
they are, in fact, generated by the accidental confluence 
of an array of actions performed – some deliberately, 
others intuitively – by individuals. 
In terms of the similarities between ‘social holism’ 
and ‘conspiracy theories’, Popper’s chief contention is as 
follows: there is a potential, if not actual, link between 
‘reference to collective entities’ and ‘reference to con-
spiracies’.184 From a Popperian point of view, these two 
reference points are both conceptually and methodo-
logically congruent, in the sense that they stem from 
‘equivalent operations’185. In this respect, the notion of 
179 See Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 459. See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), 
p. 237.
180 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 237.
181 See Popper (2002 [1948]), p. 459. See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), 
p. 237.
182 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 237.
183 Ibid., p. 238 (italics added).
184 See ibid., p. 239.
185 Ibid., p. 239.
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intentionality plays a pivotal role. In a conspiracy, a spe-
cific (usually rather limited) number of individuals come 
together ‘to co-ordinate their actions with the intention 
to seize power’186. Conspiracies tend to be conceived 
of as (a) secretive, (b) collective, (c) co-ordinated, (d) 
intended, (e) goal-oriented, (f) power-driven, (g) illegiti-
mate, and – in most cases – (h) subversive. 
As Boltanski points out, it is noteworthy that Popper 
does not distinguish between legally constituted entities, 
sociologically constituted entities, and narrative entities.187 
Popper’s reading of the alleged affinities between ‘social 
holism’ and ‘conspiracy theories’ may apply to the second 
and third category, but it is hard to see how it may be rel-
evant to the first category. By definition, ‘the very orienta-
tion of the law […] must allow, through deliberation, for 
the co-ordination and implementation of a common deci-
sion, which a spokesperson makes public’188. Insofar as the 
judicial decision-making process has followed appropri-
ate rules and regulations, it can be regarded as a rational 
procedure based on key democratic principles – such as 
public accessibility, transparency, and accountability.189
AGAINST AND BEYOND ‘POPPER’S CURSE’
Boltanski offers a provocative account of the extent 
to which, from the mid-twentieth century onwards, the 
development of sociology as a discipline was, in several 
respects, a response to what he describes as ‘Popper’s 
curse’190. As part of his critical overview of recent trends 
in sociology, Boltanski identifies various key approaches:
a.
Methodological individualism places a strong empha-
sis on the role of individual actors, capable of making 
informed decisions by virtue of their rational facul-
ties. To a greater or lesser degree, most versions of this 
doctrine are inspired by microeconomics, founded on 
statistical tools and/or mathematical modelling, and 
expressed in ‘rational actor’ or ‘rational choice’ theories 
– especially those prominent in the United States (in the 
1960s and 1970s) and, under the influence of Raymond 
Boudon191, in France. From this perspective, social phe-
186 Ibid., p. 239 (punctuation modified).
187 See ibid., p. 239.
188 Ibid., p. 239 (italics in original) (punctuation modified).
189 See, for instance: Habermas (1989 [1962]); Habermas (1996 [1992]); 
Habermas (1998); Habermas (2018 [2009]). See also, for example: Alexy 
(1998); Rosenfeld and Arato (1998); Susen (2010); Susen (2011b); Susen 
(2018b); Susen (2021).
190 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. 240–251.
191 See, for instance: Boudon (1971 [1968]); Boudon (1972); Boudon (1974 
[1971]); Boudon (1980 [1971]); Boudon (1981 [1979]); Boudon (2005).
nomena – including social practices, structures, and 
constellations – are the product of individual choices, 
which are irreducible to actors’ membership in commu-
nities or collectives.
Methodological individualism, however, is fraught 
with difficulties. One problem attached to this frame-
work is that it is based on a somewhat distorted con-
ception of sociology. Making reference to communi-
ties or collectives is ‘hardly the sole prerogative of 
sociologists’192. Indeed, most sociologists – even those 
who subscribe to some form of structuralism – empha-
size – or at least accept – ‘the self-reflexiveness of social 
action’193, which is derived from the critical capacities 
with which ordinary people appear to be equipped. 
Another problem arising from methodological individ-
ualism is that it lacks a viable alternative to accounting 
for the empirical significance of the ‘fictions’ associated 
with ‘collectives’: ‘sociology has to recognize that these 
fictions seem to be in some sense necessary, and that 
they must be granted a place in sociological theory’194. 
It is difficult to see how methodological individualism 
can convincingly conceptualize, let alone explain, the 
existence of institutions. Arguably, these can be regard-
ed as solidified forms of action and interaction that 
‘social life cannot do without’195. Another major issue 
is that its statistical tools and/or mathematical models 
will struggle to make sense of the actors’ experiences, 
perceptions, and interpretations, which are crucial 
to the ways in which they relate to, engage with, and 
attribute meaning to the world.196
b.
Analytic Marxism was developed, above all, in Anglo-
Saxon countries during the 1980s.197 Among its key 
authors were Gerald A. Cohen198, John Roemer199, Jon 
Elster200, and Philippe van Parijs201. The common aim 
of the different advocates of this project was to renew 
Marxism by cross-fertilizing it with those approaches 
that appeared to be opposed to, and incompatible with, 
its own presuppositions. Among these approaches are 
logical positivism, rational choice theory, and game the-
ory. Broadly speaking, analytic Marxism converges with 
192 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 241.
193 Ibid., p. 241.
194 Ibid., p. 241.
195 Ibid., p. 241. Cf. Boltanski (2011 [2009]), pp. 50–82.
196 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 241.
197 See ibid., pp. 241–242. See also, for instance: Balibar, Bidet, Lecercle, 
and Texier (1990); Carver and Thomas (1995).
198 See Cohen (1995) and Cohen (2000 [1978]).
199 See Roemer (1986) and Roemer (1994).
200 See Elster (1985), Elster (1986a), Elster (1986b), Elster (2000), and 
Elster and Hylland (1986).
201 See Parijs (1993).
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atomism in that it seeks to dispose of ‘superfluous enti-
ties’202 and to use ‘simple logical forms’203 as a concep-
tual foundation of its undertaking. Crucially, it regards – 
as in the case of Jon Elster – ‘the actors’ choices, actions, 
and strategies’204 as fundamental to the unfolding of 
social life in general and economic life in particular. On 
this account, ‘methodological collectivism’ suffers from a 
naïve trust in the quasi-metaphysical notion that ‘there 
are supra-individual entities that are prior to individuals 
in the explanatory order’205. 
One of the main problems with this framework, 
however, is that it deradicalizes Marxism, to the degree 
that, in essence, it replaces its original emphasis on 
exploitation and class antagonism with a (reformist) 
‘theory of distributive justice’206. In brief, Marxism is 
replaced with Rawlsianism. Analytic Marxism, since it 
uses the weapons of those opposed to Marxism, ‘ends 
up gradually turning into a trial of Marxism’207, if not 
– as fierce critics may add – into the burial of Marx-
ism.
c.
Given its emphasis on the importance of different sets 
of social structures, both moderate and radical versions 
of structuralism are diametrically opposed to meth-
odological individualism. As such, structuralism may 
be regarded as the intellectual epitome of social holism 
and, consequently, as one of the main targets of Popper’s 
aforementioned critique. The key theoretical question 
that poses itself in this context is how to make sense of 
the relationship between structure and agency – that is, 
between sets of structures, which are portrayed ‘as if they 
existed independently of the individuals’208, and sets of 
actions, which are performed by agents immersed in the 
production and reproduction of more or less solidified 
forms of sociality. In extreme – and, arguably, deter-
minist – versions of structuralism, actors are reduced 
to mere ‘carriers’ or ‘bearers’ of structures, which exert 
their power ‘behind people’s backs’.209 On this account, 
202 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 242.
203 Ibid., p. 242.
204 See Elster (1985), pp. 10–15. See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 242.
205 Elster (1985), p. 6. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 242.
206 Elster (1985), p. 516. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 242.
207 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 242.
208 Ibid., p. 243.
209 See, for example: Althusser (1969 [1965]); Althusser (1971); Pou-
lantzas (1973 [1968]); Poulantzas (1980 [1978]). On structuralism in 
the humanities and social sciences, see, for instance: Ashenden (2005); 
Baert (1998); Baert and Silva (2010 [1998]-a); Boudon (1971 [1968]); 
Bourdieu (1968); Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982); Frère (2004); Joas and 
Knöbl (2009 [2004]); Karsenti (2011 [2007/2011]); Lévi-Strauss (1993 
[1963]); Lévi-Strauss (1993 [1973]); Peters (1999); Susen (2015a), pp. 3, 
42, 71, 73, 74, 94, 97, 129, 162, 168, 216, and 263.
actors produce and reproduce social structures (notably 
economic, technological, political, cultural, ideologi-
cal, linguistic, institutional, and civilizational ones) in a 
largely unconscious fashion.
A significant shortcoming of this mode of analysis, 
however, is that it understates the extent to which social 
actors are equipped with critical, reflective, and moral 
capacities, permitting them to acquire a sense of agency, 
autonomy, and responsibility when engaging in the con-
struction of social reality. One need not be a Kantian to 
recognize that human beings, unlike other living crea-
tures, have the species-constitutive capacity to draw on 
the triadic power of rationality – namely Verstand, Ver-
nunft, and Urteilskraft210 – to build their place in the 
world as purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective 
entities.211 
d.
Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism, notably his theory of 
the habitus, sought to overcome the antinomy between 
objectivist and subjectivist frameworks in the humani-
ties and social sciences.212 It aimed to accomplish this 
by drawing on multiple sources, leading to Bourdieu’s 
famous ‘outline of a theory of practice’213. The ques-
tion of whether or not Bourdieu succeeded in bridging 
the gap between objectivist and subjectivist perspectives 
has been discussed, often in great detail and from dif-
ferent angles, by numerous commentators and remains 
an issue of contention.214 In this respect, the interplay of 
‘habitus’, ‘field’, and ‘capital’ is essential, although there 
is a danger that, over time, these conceptual tools could 
210 On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2009), pp. 104–105; Susen 
(2010), pp. 112–113; Susen (2013), pp. 326 and 330–331; Susen (2015a), 
pp. 13, 105, 215, 219, 234, 236, 259, and 275; Susen (2015b), pp. 1027–
1028; Susen (2020b), pp. 131, 137, and 138.
211 See Susen (2007), Chapter 10 (esp. pp. 280–283).
212 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. 243–245. See also, for exam-
ple: Bourdieu (1980), pp. 43, 46, 78, 87, 103, 178, 202, 234, and 242; 
Bourdieu (1982), pp. 35–37; Bourdieu (1993 [1984]-b), pp. 55, 57, and 
59; Bourdieu (1994), p. 169; Bourdieu (1997b), pp. 16–17, 43, 77, 122, 
157, 159–160, 163–167, 185, and 225; Bourdieu (1998), pp. 9 and 110; 
Bourdieu (2005 [2000]), pp. 210–213; Bourdieu (2001b), pp. 7, 24, 
and 31; Bourdieu (2001a), pp. 76, 151, and 153; Bourdieu (2002b), p. 
353; Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968), pp. 34, 93–94, and 
101; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a), p. 66; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(1992b), pp. 121–122; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c), pp. 151 and 
162.
213 See Bourdieu (1977 [1972]).
214 See Susen (2007), Chapters 5–8. In the secondary literature see, for 
example: Accardo (1997), pp. 200, 229, and 257–258; Addi (2002), pp. 
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be converted into dogmatic devices – an undesirable sce-
nario of which Bourdieu was aware.215
It is far from clear, however, whether or not 
Bourdieu’s approach permits us to bypass, let alone to 
transcend, ‘Popper’s curse’. The principal contributions 
and limitations of Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ have 
been extensively scrutinized and documented.216 Add-
ing to this debate, Boltanski distinguishes two funda-
mental types of habitus: understood in the strong sense, 
the concept of ‘habitus’ may designate an objectively 
determined and subjectively internalized programme; 
understood in the weak sense, the concept of ‘habitus’ 
may refer to the rather vague idea of ‘social personal-
ity’ or ‘basic personality’.217 Irrespective of the question 
of which of these two interpretations is more useful, 
Boltanski posits that Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus, 
since ‘it was intended to dramatize structures and per-
sons together, was not enough to silence Popper-inspired 
reservations and may even have stimulated them’218. 
Ultimately, Popperian scholars may have good reason to 
reject Bourdieu’s structuralist approach for remaining 
trapped in the premises of ‘a sociology of suspicion and 
conspiracy’219, not least because of his claim that habitus 
reflects a form of ‘non-orchestrated orchestration’220.
e.
Micro-sociological approaches are another case in 
point.221 In Boltanski’s eyes, they can be regarded as 
part of the general attempt, shared by a large propor-
tion of modern sociologists, to escape ‘Popper’s curse’. 
Micro-sociological frameworks are intellectually related 
to – and, in some cases, inspired by – ethnomethodol-
ogy222, social phenomenology223, symbolic interaction-
ism224, and pragmatism225. They may be interpreted as 
having the capacity to circumvent ‘the Popperian curse’ 
for one overriding reason: they take ordinary actors seri-
215 On this issue, see, for instance, Bourdieu, Schultheis, and Pfeuffer 
(2011 [2000]).
216 For an overview, see, for example, Susen (2007), Chapter 8. See also 
Susen and Turner (2011).
217 See Boltanski (2003). See also Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 245.
218 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 245.
219 Ibid., p. 245. Cf. Heinrich (2007).
220 On this issue, see, for instance: Emirbayer and Johnson (2008); Susen 
(2007), p. 187. See also, for example: Bourdieu (1980), p. 187; Bourdieu 
(1990 [1980]), p. 109.
221 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. 245–247. Cf. Baert and Silva (2010 
[1998]-b) and Roberts (2006).
222 See, for instance: Garfinkel (1984 [1967]); Heritage (1984).
223 See, for instance: Chelstrom (2013); Schütz (1962).
224 See, for instance: Joas (1987); Plummer (1991); Plummer (1996); 
Rock (1979).
225 See, for instance: Baert and Turner (2004); Baert and Turner (2007); 
Durkheim (1983 [1955]); Joas (1993); Karsenti (2012 [2006]); Rorty 
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ously. Obviously, this is the motto of Boltanski’s own 
enterprise, commonly labelled ‘the pragmatic sociology 
of critique’226. It is, however, also both an ontological 
and a methodological commitment of micro-sociological 
approaches: 
• ontological, because it conceives of the very nature of 
human actors as protagonists equipped with species-
constitutive capacities (such as culture, language, 
consciousness, self-awareness, selfhood, personhood, 
identity, subjectivity, agency, morality, aesthetic 
judgement, and reason);227 
• methodological, because it posits that the specificity 
of the human condition, including human forms of 
life, needs to be reflected in the idiosyncrasy of the 
scientific tools by means of which social practices, 
including symbolically mediated interactions, are 
studied.228
Micro-sociological approaches recognize that ‘the 
“actors themselves” designate the beings that make up 
their environment, […] qualify those beings, and in so 
doing contribute to “performing” the social world’229. 
Thus, not only are human actors spatiotemporally situat-
ed in the world, but, in addition, they contribute to con-
structing, deconstructing, and reconstructing it. Micro-
sociological approaches may be criticized for underes-
timating the importance of ‘large collective entities or 
institutions’230. Unlike methodological-individualist 
approaches, however, they cannot be accused of denying 
their existence.
Yet, even if – in line with Boltanski’s account – 
one acknowledges that micro-sociological approaches 
should be praised for highlighting the socio-ontological 
significance of ‘the actors’ competencies’231, including 
their moral sense or sense of justice232, and for reject-
ing a rigid dichotomy between ‘a clairvoyant sociolo-
gist and a transparent and invisible actor (in the clas-
sic versions of structuralism) or an actor who has been 
deceived (in its critical versions)’233, one needs to be 
aware of their limitations. Arguably, among their most 
significant weaknesses is that they leave little, if any, 
room for the possibility of providing ‘a cartographic 
representation of the social world as a pre-existing 
cosmos’234, in which subjects are inevitably exposed 
226 See Susen and Turner (2014).
227 See Susen (2020b), esp. pp. 125, 131, 137, 138, 142, 144, and 147.
228 See Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 176–182, 184, 185, 193, and 200n35.
229 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 246 (italics in original).
230 Ibid., p. 246.
231 Ibid., p. 247.
232 See Boltanski (2012 [1990]). See also Boltanski (1993), Boltanski 
(2009b), and Boltanski and Thévenot (1989).
233 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 247.
234 Ibid., p. 247.
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to, dependent upon, and limited by ‘a system of con-
straints’235 and of underlying structural forces, which, 
by definition, transcends the narrow horizon of their 
immediate environment.
f.
The sociology of social networks is captured in the label 
network analysis – a paradigm that began to gain trac-
tion from the 1980s onwards and represents a firmly 
relational ontology.236 This approach, which is argu-
ably another way of bypassing ‘Popper’s curse’, draws 
on the works of seminal scholars, such as Harrison 
White, Scott Boorman, and Ronald Breiger237, but also 
– although admittedly less directly – Jacob Levy More-
no238. Strictly speaking, network analysis presupposes 
that ‘there is no way of knowing in advance how groups 
or social positions come about, i.e. how combinations 
of relations are formed’239. If this is true, then all social 
phenomena, including social formations, are character-
ized by a degree of unpredictability that makes it impos-
sible to know in advance if, let alone how, they enter the 
theatre of co-existence, composed of both human and 
non-human agents. Furthermore, it is not things-in-
themselves (at the noumenal level) but, rather, the net-
work-structures-established-between-agents (at the rela-
tional level) that, as both empowering and constraining 
forces, are ‘capable of engendering “emerging effects”’240. 
Put differently, agency is derived not from ‘substances’ 
or ‘essences’, which – in terms of their ontological status 
– depend entirely on themselves, but, rather, from the 
networks established between different (both human and 
non-human) entities.241
Thus, network analysts may claim to be able to 
overcome the opposition between methodological 
individualism and social holism, since their frame-
work is founded on the assumption that ‘structure is 
the emerging effect of interactions’242 – and, as one 
may add, agency is also the emerging effect of interac-
tions. In this sense, networks are equivalent to ‘modes 
of totalization based on a generalized connectivity’243: 
their universality transcends the particularity of the 
235 Ibid., p. 247 (italics added).
236 See ibid., pp. 247–248. See also, for instance, Parrochia (1993).
237 See White, Boorman, and Breiger (1976) as well as Boorman and 
White (1976).
238 See Moreno (1947).
239 Degenne and Forse (1999 [1994]), p. 2. See also Boltanski (2014 
[2012]), p. 248.
240 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 248.
241 See, for instance: Callon (1989); Latour (1987); Latour (1993 [1991]); 
Latour (2005); Latour (2013 [2012]).
242 Degenne and Forse (1999 [1994]), p. 10. See also Boltanski (2014 
[2012]), p. 248.
243 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 248.
relations established between entities or groups of enti-
ties. Given its focus on webs of social relations, net-
work analysis – similar to structuralism – is capable of 
going beyond ‘cumbersome and unseemly objects’244. 
In his critique of ‘naïve collectivism’, Popper vehement-
ly rejected both the ontological claim that these objects 
existed in the social world and the epistemo-methodo-
logical claim that that they ought to play a pivotal role 
in sociological analysis. 
Regardless of whether or not network analysis pro-
vides the conceptual, methodological, and empirical 
resources to do justice to ‘the open character of modern 
societies’245, it suffers from serious limitations. One of 
these limitations is reflected in the fact that its implicit 
radical constructivism makes it hard to grasp the onto-
logical status of constitutive (that is, both human and 
non-human) elements of existence. If ontology were 
reducible to relationality, then ‘beings’ and ‘relations’ 
would be the same thing (and there would be no point 
in differentiating them). All entities are both relational 
beings and relational beings.
ACTORS, ENTITIES, AND MULTIPOSITIONALITY
Boltanski stresses the significance of multiposition-
ality for a comprehensive understanding of social life.246 
An individual actor ‘may belong to an unlimited num-
ber of entities’247. These may be legally constituted enti-
ties, sociologically constituted entities, narrative entities, 
or other types of entities. Actors occupy multiple posi-
tions in society. These positions are represented by par-
ticular entities, each of which has its contours and goals. 
For instance, an actor may take on numerous positions: 
child, parent, friend, relative, employer, employee, buyer, 
seller, native, foreigner, and so on. These positions are 
located in different social fields: cultural, political, eco-
nomic, linguistic, and so on. These fields may be clas-
sified according to different criteria: collective vs. indi-
vidual, public vs. private, visible vs. concealed, open 
vs. closed, and so on. These positions and fields may 
be composed of legally defined entities, sociologically 
defined entities, narrative entities, and/or other – typo-
logically distinct – entities. 
One of sociology’s difficulties stems from the fact that it 
studies both persons and entities that are not persons. 
We may qualify persons by referring to these entities […]. 
244 Ibid., p. 248.
245 Ibid., p. 248.
246 See ibid., pp. 251–253. See also Boltanski (1973b).
247 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 251.
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But (and this is fortunate) no entity is so globalizing or 
so totalizing that reference to it can condense the entire 
identity of a person […].248
Sociology engages with both human and non-human 
entities. The former may be qualified by reference to the 
latter – not only from the perspective of ordinary actors, 
participating in the construction of their lifeworlds, but 
also from the perspective of social-scientific observers, 
examining the practices and structures making human 
forms of life possible in the first place. The latter, howev-
er, may never completely overpower the former: even the 
most totalizing forms of domination cannot eliminate 
the potential for agency possessed by every human being. 
Irrespective of the potential for agency inherent in 
all members of humanity, it is important to debunk the 
myth of full self-control and final-instance comprehen-
sibility. If there is an ‘ordinary metaphysics of mem-
bers of our societies’249, it needs ‘to recognize as persons 
beings that cannot be reduced to an accumulation of 
properties and therefore cannot be known in their total-
ity, and cannot be known once and for all, even by the 
actor involved’250. In practice, every actor ‘must be will-
ing to risk the disclosure’251 without knowing ‘whom he 
[or she] reveals when he [or she] discloses himself [or 
herself] in deed or word’252. The presentation of self in 
everyday life253 is a risky business, in the sense that the 
moment we interact with others we reveal something 
about ourselves, even – or, perhaps, especially – if we 
make a sustained effort to avoid doing so. As interde-
pendent and intersubjective beings, we cannot escape 
our social condition.
Whatever the underlying intricacies of this condi-
tion may be, sociology is not reducible to ‘a detective 
story, still less a spy story, even if it sometimes tries to 
solve mysteries and even if it finds itself confronting 
the question of conspiracy’254. Undoubtedly, there are 
important historical and intellectual parallels between, 
on the one hand, investigations into alleged myster-
ies and conspiracies and, on the other hand, sociologi-
cal inquiries – notably the urge to uncover structural 
and agential forces whose existence (and influence) may 
escape our common-sense perception of reality. And 
yet, there remain substantial differences between the 
248 Ibid., p. 252.
249 Ibid., p. 252.
250 Ibid., p. 252 (italics in original).
251 Arendt (1998 [1958]), p. 180. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 252.
252 Arendt (1998 [1958]), p. 180. See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 252.
253 See Goffman (1971 [1959]). See also Susen (2007), pp. 84–85, and 
Susen (2016d). In addition, see Habermas (1987 [1981]) and Habermas 
(1992 [1988]).
254 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 260. Cf. Eckert (2016), p. 245.
assumptions made about the nature of mysteries and 
conspiracies, purportedly exposed in detective and spy 
stories, and the assumptions made about the nature of 
different levels and components of social reality, identi-
fied and explored in sociological inquiries.
II. 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
This final section offers some critical reflections on 
important issues arising from Boltanski’s examination 
of the relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries – notably with regard to its limitations and 
shortcomings.
1.
It is striking that Boltanski’s account is based on numer-
ous core dichotomies255: essence vs. appearance, hidden 
vs. visible, genuine vs. deceptive, unofficial vs. official, 
unconscious vs. conscious, ordinary vs. scientific, micro 
vs. macro, particular vs. universal, contingent vs. tran-
scendental, phenomenal vs. noumenal, world vs. reality, 
nature vs. culture, individual vs. society, methodological 
individualism vs. social holism, fact vs. value, knowledge 
vs. opinion, experience vs. reason, empiricism vs. ration-
alism, materialism vs. idealism, objectivism vs. subjec-
tivism, and substantialism vs. relationalism – to mention 
only a few. Even if some of them are not explicitly men-
tioned, all of these dichotomies are directly or indirectly 
relevant to Boltanski’s approach. One may defend his 
allusions and references to these (and other) dichotomies 
on several grounds: 
a. It is hard, if not impossible, to grasp the history of 
the humanities and social sciences without a criti-
cal understanding of these dichotomies, especially 
in terms of the degree to which they have structured 
and codified ground-breaking modes of inquiry in 
the modern age.
b. Even if, in some areas of research, they have gone 
out of fashion or even been rejected outright, they 
continue to play a pivotal role in the humanities and 
social sciences. 
c. Owing to their enduring importance, they remain 
crucial to making sense of the key debates shaping 
intellectual thought and scientific investigations in 
the early twenty-first century. 
What is missing from Boltanski’s outline, however, 
is a critical engagement with the extent to which these 
dichotomies should, or should not, be overcome. Dif-
255 Cf. Jenks (1998).
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ferent commentators will come to different conclusions 
when reflecting on the validity of the aforementioned 
(and thematically related) dichotomies: ‘erroneous’, 
‘misleading’, ‘Western-centric’, ‘anthropocentric’, ‘mal-
estream’, ‘reductive’, or – if judged in a more favour-
able light – ‘increasingly blurred’.256 Given that – per-
haps unwittingly – these dichotomies are attributed a 
quasi-foundational status in Boltanski’s framework, an 
in-depth examination of their validity in contemporary 
intellectual discourse would contribute to the conceptual 
and methodological strength of his analysis.
2.
The distinction between ‘the ordinary’ and ‘the scientif-
ic’ is central to Boltanski’s oeuvre in general and to his 
post-Bourdieusian paradigm shift in particular.257 The 
transition from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ to Boltan-
ski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ contains various 
important facets, including a radical reconceptualization 
of the relationship between, on the one hand, ordinary 
people and laypersons and, on the other hand, scientists 
and experts. Boltanski is right to question the project 
of erecting an epistemic hierarchy according to which 
scientific knowledge is superior to ordinary knowledge 
(and, by implication, scientists and experts are neces-
sarily more insightful than ordinary people and layper-
sons). Moreover, he convincingly emphasizes the degree 
to which, in contemporary societies, the boundaries 
between these two types of epistemic engagement with 
the world are increasingly blurred, as expressed in the 
concept of ‘reflexive modernity’258. 
Still, he could have provided a more systematic 
account of the relationship between ‘ordinary knowl-
edge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’. Arguably, such an 
256 See, for instance, Susen (2015a), esp. pp. 11, 41, 90, 100, 115, 136, 
259, and 298n32. Cf. Dascal (2008).
257 On the relationship between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’, see, for instance, Susen (2014 [2015]) and Susen 
(2015b). In addition, see, for example: Atkinson (2020); Bénatouïl 
(1999a); Bénatouïl (1999b); Callinicos (2006), pp. 4–5, 15, 51–82, and 
155–156; Celikates (2009), pp. 136–157; de Blic and Mouchard (2000a); 
de Blic and Mouchard (2000b); Frère (2004), esp. pp. 92–93 and 97n4; 
Nachi (2006), pp. 188–189; Susen (2007), pp. 223–224, 227n25, 228n50, 
229n51, 229n52, and 271n24; Wagner (1999); Wagner (2000). On this 
debate, see also: Boltanski (1990a), pp. 9–134; Boltanski (1990b), pp. 
124–134; Boltanski (1998), esp. pp. 248–253; Boltanski (1999–2000), pp. 
303–311; Boltanski (2002a), pp. 276–281 and 281–284; Boltanski (2003), 
pp. 153–161; Boltanski (2008); Boltanski (2009a), esp. pp. 39–82; Bol-
tanski and Chiapello (1999), esp. pp. 633–640; Boltanski and Honneth 
(2009), pp. 81–86, 92–96, and 100–114; Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen 
(2010), pp. 152–154 and 160–162; Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), pp. 
40, 41–43, 43–46, and 265–270; Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), pp. 
364–365.
258 See, for instance: Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994); Beck and Lau 
(2005), esp. pp. 550–555; Kyung-Sup (2010); Susen (2015a), esp. pp. 
143–145 and 238–239.
endeavour needs to recognize that, when seeking to 
grasp the relationship between these two orders of epis-
temic construction, we are confronted with three funda-
mental options:259 
a. Scientific knowledge is superior to ordinary knowl-
edge, because the underlying structural mechanisms 
and causalities of both the natural world and the 
social world escape people’s common-sense under-
standing of reality.
b. Ordinary knowledge is superior to scientific knowl-
edge, because the authenticity of subjective and 
intersubjective experiences, derived from actors’ 
bodily involvement in both the natural world and 
the social world, escapes conceptually sophisticated, 
methodically detached, and predictably formulaic 
explanations of reality.
c. Both scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge are 
legitimate and potentially insightful. Their epistemic 
value depends on the kind of knowledge one intends 
to produce, because the search for cognitive valid-
ity always takes place from a particular position in, 
and in relation to specific aspects of, reality. In other 
words, the point is not to oppose but to cross-ferti-
lize scientific and ordinary ways of engaging with 
the world.
Thus, a comprehensive sociology of mysteries, con-
spiracies, and inquiries needs to provide a systematic 
account of (a) the epistemic power and resources ema-
nating from both ordinary and scientific knowledge, 
(b) the epistemic illusions and limitations stemming 
from both ordinary and scientific knowledge, and (c) 
the epistemic zones of cross-fertilization that have been, 
or can be, established between ordinary and scientific 
knowledge.260 The study of mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries may be inspired by the scientistic pursuit of 
positivity (derived from the reliability of experience-
based knowledge), objectivity (founded on the possibil-
ity of value-free knowledge), and universality (expressed 
in the validity of context-transcending knowledge). 
Critical sociologists of mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries, however, need to highlight the extent to 
which the scientistic quest for positivity, objectivity, 
and universality is inevitably permeated by historically 
contingent variables, such as normativity and subjectiv-
ity, which imply that the specifically human access to 
reality is symbolically mediated, socially constituted, 
and spatiotemporally situated. In short, a comprehen-
sive sociology of mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries 
requires a critical epistemology.
259 See Susen (2014 [2012]), esp. p. 193.
260 For a brief outline of such a project, see ibid., pp. 193–194.
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3.
Boltanski stresses that both everyday life and scientific 
research comprise a ‘constant back-and-forth movement 
[…] between what can be known through experience 
and what can only be known in a mediated fashion’261. 
This contention, however, hinges on a crude distinc-
tion between naïve empiricism (‘known through expe-
rience’) and idealism (‘known in a mediated fashion’). 
This distinction is reductive – and, possibly, misleading 
– in that it fails to account for the fact that, ever since 
Immanuel Kant262 entered the scene of intellectual life, 
it is no longer tenable to maintain that we, as humans, 
have direct access to the world, let alone to ignore the 
major – and, arguably, transcendental – role played by 
our mental and physical (pre-)dispositions in processing 
information derived from our senses. 
Put differently, the whole point of Kant’s project 
was to synthesize empiricism (à la Francis Bacon, John 
Locke, and David Hume) and rationalism (à la René 
Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz), argu-
ing – within the framework of his transcendental ideal-
ism263 – that all we have access to is the ‘phenomenal 
world’ (that is, things as they appear to us in space and 
time), rather than the ‘noumenal world’ (that is, things-
in-themselves). On this view, the ‘phenomenal world’ 
depends on, but is not congruent with, the ‘noumenal 
world’. Crucially, whereas the former is knowable, the 
latter is only inferable. Kant’s account of (a) ‘analytic 
propositions’ and ‘synthetic propositions’ and (b) a priori 
knowledge and a posteriori knowledge demonstrates that 
empiricism on its own is blind, just as rationalism on 
its own remains empty. The two approaches need to be 
combined to grasp the complementary functions of expe-
rience and reason in human forms of life. The key point 
in relation to Boltanski’s above-mentioned statement, 
then, is to recognize that ‘sense-based experience’ is not 
tantamount to ‘direct access to the world’ and ‘reason-
guided reflection’ is not equivalent to ‘pure logic about 
the world’. Just as empiricism and rationalism should be 
synthesized by philosophy, experience and reason have 
always already been synthesized by humanity.
4.
Boltanski’s analysis rests on a crucial distinction 
between two levels of reality: on the one hand, the level 
of surfaces and appearances; on the other hand, the level 
of essences and substances. In philosophical terms, this 
261 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 229 (italics added).
262 See Kant (1995 [1781]), Kant (1995 [1788]), and Kant (1995 [1790]). 
See also Kant (2009 [1784]).
263 See, for instance: Allison (2004 [1983]); Gram (1984); Senderowicz 
(2005); Watkins (2002); Waxman (1991).
distinction may – at first glance – be captured in the 
opposition ‘phenomenal’ vs. ‘noumenal’. In sociological 
terms, this distinction has major socio-cognitive impli-
cations, insofar as it hinges on the following twofold 
assumption: the former is not only ‘official’ but also – at 
least potentially – ‘illusory’, ‘deceptive’, and ‘misleading’; 
the latter is not only ‘unofficial’ but also ‘real’, ‘genuine’, 
and ‘authentic’. Conspiracy theories tend to go a step 
further by portraying the latter, contrary to the former, 
not only as ‘deep’, ‘hidden’, and ‘concealed’ but also as 
‘threatening’, ‘menacing’, and ‘malevolent’ as well as 
‘controlling’, ‘power-driven’, and ‘secretive’ – if not ‘plot-
ting’, ‘devious’, ‘insidious’, and ‘unlawful’. The distinc-
tion between these two fundamental levels of ontology, 
then, lies at the core of Boltanski’s ‘REALITY vs. reali-
ty’264 antinomy. 
Boltanski’s framework may benefit, however, from 
incorporating philosophical intuitions into his socio-
logical approach. The foundational distinction between 
‘essence’ and ‘appearance’ can be traced all the way back 
to Ancient Greek philosophy.265 Marx’s famous dictum 
that ‘all science would be superfluous if the outward 
appearance and the essence of things directly coincid-
ed’266 touches upon the same issue. On Marx’s account, 
one of the main objectives of scientific activity is to go 
beyond the surface level of appearances by penetrating 
into the substance level of essences. Insofar as scientific 
inquiries are terminologically precise, epistemologically 
reflexive, conceptually sophisticated, methodologically 
rigorous, and empirically substantiated, they increase 
the chances of delivering on this front. If so, they are 
capable of describing, analysing, interpreting, explain-
ing, and – if desired – making judgements (and, in some 
cases, making partially – if not entirely – accurate pre-
dictions) about the constitution, functioning, and devel-
opment of reality, or of particular aspects of reality, in a 
more or less systematic fashion. Of course, this is not the 
end of the story. 
Large parts of the social sciences have abandoned 
a positivist self-conception by accepting the Weberian 
contention that ‘[s]ociology […] is a science concern-
ing itself with the interpretive understanding of social 
action’267. In this sense, Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology 
264 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. xv (italics in original). See ibid., Chapter 
1.
265 See, for instance, Grayling (2020 [2019]), Part I.
266 Marx (2000/1977 [1867/1885/1894]), p. 532 (from Volume III of 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy) (quotation modified). On 
this point, see, for instance: Holloway and Susen (2013), p. 27; Larrain 
(1996); Susen (2011a), p. 451; Susen (2011c), pp. 74–75; Susen (2015a), 
pp. 51 and 167.
267 Weber (1978 [1922]), p. 4 (italics added). On this point, see, for 
instance, Susen (2011c), p. 75.
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of critique’ stands in the Weberian tradition, emphasiz-
ing the perspective-taking (‘soft’) insights obtained from 
Verstehen; by contrast, Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ is 
firmly situated in the Marxian tradition, stressing the 
perspective-transcending (‘hard’) knowledge gained 
from Erklären.268 The story gets far more complicated, 
however, if the Kantian concern with the relationship – 
and potential discrepancy – between ‘the phenomenal’ 
and ‘the noumenal’ is taken into consideration. Indeed, 
from a Kantian point of view, even the most erudite, 
refined, and cutting-edge forms of scientific investiga-
tion cannot undo the fact that, while ‘the phenomenal’ 
may be knowable, ‘the noumenal’ is only inferable.269 
This insight lies at the core of the fallibilist spirit perme-
ating critical epistemologies.270
If Kant is right, then the epistemological implications 
– not only for the study of mysteries and conspiracies, but 
also for the status of scientific inquiries – are of an order 
of magnitude whose far-reaching significance can hardly 
be overstated. Our scientifically informed grasp of ‘the 
essence of things’ may be as limited, if not deceptive and 
misleading, as our ordinary grasp of ‘the outward appear-
ance of things’. In this respect, the point is not to make 
a case for radical epistemological scepticism – let alone 
relativism, nihilism, or fatalism. Rather, the point is to 
concede that fundamental epistemic distinctions – such 
as ‘common sense’ vs. ‘critical thinking’, ‘ordinary knowl-
edge’ vs. ‘scientific knowledge’, ‘appearance’ vs. ‘essence’, 
‘illusion’ vs. ‘reality’, ‘REALITY’ vs. ‘reality’ – acquire a 
remarkable level of complexity if one shares the Kantian 
position. Although this may sound counterintuitive, from 
a Kantian perspective, both elements of each of these con-
ceptual pairs remain caught at the ‘phenomenal level’. On 
this account, the ‘noumenal level’ – that is, the world of 
things-in-themselves – has always been, and will always 
remain, inaccessible to the human senses and human rea-
son and, hence, to human understanding. The real mys-
teries are not those that can or cannot be uncovered, but 
those about which knowledge can only be inferred. 
5.
A key question arising from Boltanski’s analysis is why, 
by and large, sociologists are not accused of conspiracy. 
268 On the distinction between the paradigm of ‘explanation’ [Erklären] 
and the paradigm of ‘understanding’ [Verstehen], see, for instance: Apel 
(1971); Apel (1979); Bourdieu (1993); Delanty (1997); Delanty and 
Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Habermas (1970); Outhwaite (1986 
[1975]); Outhwaite (1987); Outhwaite (1998); Outhwaite (2000); Susen 
(2011a); Susen (2011b); Susen (2013), p. 326; Susen (2015a), pp. 48 and 
66–67.
269 See Kant (1995 [1781]). See also Ward (2006), Part I.
270 Cf. Brown (2018), Cooke (2006), and Frederick (2020). Cf. also Susen 
(2020c), pp. 756–757.
The inquisitive and critical attitude advocated by most 
sociologists – especially those interested in the role of 
power relations – is based on reflection, suspicion, and 
scepticism. This orientation obliges them to scrutinize 
vital epistemic components of people’s lifeworlds – such 
as tradition, doxa, and common sense. In addition, it 
requires them to unmask the ideological tools designed 
and employed to defend, and to conceal, the ‘real’ inter-
ests of particular individual and collective actors, nota-
bly those occupying powerful positions in society.271 
Moreover, sociologists tend to attribute the occurrence 
of micro-, meso-, and macro-historical events to the 
actions performed by different entities. These entities 
may be classified as ‘human’ or ‘non-human’, ‘individu-
al’ or ‘collective’, ‘substantial’ or ‘relational’, ‘ephemeral’ 
or ‘structural’, ‘symbolic’ or ‘material’ – to mention only 
the most common ways of categorizing them. Sociolo-
gists tend to confer different kinds and degrees of inten-
tionality, and thus the capacity for action, to these enti-
ties. 
The pressing question that poses itself in this context 
is why, by and large, sociologists are not accused of con-
spiracy. One may challenge the presuppositions underly-
ing this question by arguing that, in effect, sociologists 
can be accused of conspiratorial – or at least quasi-con-
spiratorial – thinking, insofar as they are committed to 
the project of uncovering underlying power relations, 
which are shaped by the interests pursued by different 
social groups (whether these be defined in terms of class, 
profession, ethnicity, ‘race’, culture, nationality, lan-
guage, sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, and/
or other key sociological variables). Indeed, Popper’s cri-
tique of ‘sociological conspiracy theories’272, including 
their alleged endorsement of the ‘intentionalist hypoth-
esis’273, is indicative of this uncharitable reading.
A more straightforward response to the preceding 
question, however, suggests that sociologists are not in 
the business of conspiracy274 but, rather, in the business 
of science275. Science – at least in its ideal-typical version, 
epitomized in the inquisitive pursuit of knowledge – is 
271 See, for instance: Susen (2014d); Susen (2016b); Susen (2015a), esp. 
Chapter 2 (section iii).
272 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 235. Cf. Pigden (1995)
273 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 224.
274 See, for instance: Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, and Gregory 
(1999); Aupers (2012); Bartlett and Miller (2010); Bjerg and Presskorn-
Thygesen (2017); Brotherton (2015); Butter and Knight (2015); Carroll 
(1987); Clarke (2002); Harambam and Aupers (2014); Harder (2018); 
Heins (2007); Moore (2018); Pigden (1995); Renard (2015); van Prooi-
jen and Douglas (2017); van Prooijen and Douglas (2018); van Prooijen 
and van Lange (2014).
275 See, for instance: Bourdieu (1993 [1984]-a); Bourdieu (2002b); 
Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1991 [1968]); Susen (2011c); 
Swedberg (2012).
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characterized by terminological precision, epistemologi-
cal reflexivity, conceptual sophistication, methodologi-
cal rigour, and empirical evidence. In addition, science is 
supposed to be motivated by the ambition to reach the 
highest possible standards of reason, argument, logic, 
justification, critique, and peer review. What is need-
ed, in other words, is a robust defence of the epistemic 
foundations of scientific inquiry276, illustrating that it has 
little, if anything, to do with a speculative, let alone fic-
tional, engagement with mysteries and conspiracies.
6.
Boltanski is right to insist on the socio-ontological cen-
trality of ambiguity. As he notes, legally defined roles 
leave little, if any, room for ambiguity: from a judi-
cial point of view, it is not possible that an individu-
al belongs more or less to an entity – for example, to a 
state, organization, association, foundation, corpora-
tion, or institution. Arguably, sociological discourses are 
more flexible than their judicial counterparts, since they 
accept, or indeed highlight, the fact that ambiguity is a 
constitutive feature of social life. On this interpretation, 
different individuals participate to different degrees in 
the construction of different entities. An issue that Bol-
tanski could have explored in further detail, however, is 
the extent to which ontological ambiguity can, and per-
haps should, be translated into methodological ambiguity 
and conceptual ambiguity. 
Due to its capacity to expose the messiness of 
human affairs, fiction – for instance, in the form of 
novels and short stories – may provide more accurate 
accounts of reality than sociological studies. In this 
sense, works of fiction are more persuasive in translating 
people’s everyday ontological ambiguity (at the experien-
tial level) into methodological ambiguity (at the opera-
tional level) and conceptual ambiguity (at the represen-
tational level) than social-scientific narratives. Granted, 
fiction has its own rules and parameters. One of its main 
strengths, however, is that it is not constrained by the 
formulaic conventions of science, notably those associ-
ated with the straitjackets of reason, argument, logic, 
justification, structure, coherence, and systematicity. Fic-
tion is not confined by the widely accepted ‘standards’ 
of scientificity – such as terminological precision, episte-
276 See, for instance: Baert (2005); Benton and Craib (2001); Bernstein 
(1983); Bourdieu (1983); Bourdieu (1995); Bourdieu (1997a); Bourdieu 
(2001a); Bourdieu (2002a); Bunge (1996); Chalmers (1999 [1976]); 
Couvalis (1997); Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dreyfus 
and Rabinow (1999); Fabiani (2005); Fay (1996); Flyvbjerg (2001); Gid-
dens (1987); Habermas (1988 [1967/1970]); Heller (1986); Hesse (1980); 
Hollis (1994); Ladyman (2001); Outhwaite (1987); Outhwaite (1996); 
Rosenberg (2008 [1988]); Susen (2015a), Chapter 1; Winch (2008 
[1958]); Yearley (2004); Ziman (2000).
mological reflexivity, conceptual sophistication, method-
ological rigour, and empirical evidence (not to mention 
reason, argument, and logic). In brief, fiction escapes the 
rigid architecture imposed by scientific criteria. 
To be clear, scientific criteria can be just as enabling 
and empowering as constraining and disempowering for 
anybody seeking to provide an insightful account of 
social reality. The point, therefore, is not to abandon sci-
ence but, rather, to recognize its limitations – not from a 
religious or spiritual angle, but from the perspective of 
everyday life. In many ways, the experiential constitu-
tion of everyday life is more genuinely reflected in fiction 
than in science. Fictional narratives leave more room for 
facing up to the inherent messiness, ambiguity, and fra-
gility of human existence277 than their scientific counter-
parts. 
It is true that, in many respects, the latter may 
appear superior to the former – especially in terms of 
their capacity to identify underlying patterns of behav-
ioural, ideological, and institutional functioning. Pat-
tern-seeking activities, however, belong as much to 
the sphere of ordinary life as to the sphere of science. 
Admittedly, the pattern-seeking spirit of ordinary actors 
may be taken to a higher level when translated into the 
pattern-seeking inquiries carried out by scientists. Pat-
tern-seeking activities may be inspired by praxis-driven 
concerns expressed by laypersons in their everyday lives 
or, alternatively, by methodologically equipped and theo-
retically informed investigations conducted by experts in 
the sphere of science. Since they are inevitably shaped 
by ‘habits of the mind’278, however, pattern-seeking 
activities – irrespective of whether they are pursued by 
laypersons or experts – are by no means guaranteed to 
generate infallible and irrefutable representations of the 
‘noumenal world’, hidden beneath the experientially 
accessible level of the ‘phenomenal world’. The question 
of whether or not both ambiguity and certainty, inde-
terminacy and determinacy, randomness and causality 
are constitutive features of both the ‘phenomenal world’ 
(things as they appear to us in space and time) and the 
‘noumenal world’ (things-in-themselves) remains a mys-
tery that, without the need for a philosophical conspira-
cy, will continue to haunt us in future inquiries into the 
condition of humanity.
7.
Boltanski’s analysis obliges us to ref lect on different 
forms and degrees of cognitive distortion, particularly in 
relation to the concepts of deception, self-deception, wish-
277 See Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]). See also, for 
instance, Cordero (2017) and Susen (2017a).
278 See Hume (2007 [1748]).
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ful thinking, bad faith, manipulation, and ideology.279 In 
this respect, the following questions arise: 
• How can each of these types of cognitive distortion 
be defined? 
• What are the main similarities and differences 
between them? 
• To what extent do they overlap? 
• To what extent do they feed off each other? 
• To what extent do they serve specific functions at 
different levels of our existence? 
• To what extent are they shaped by objective, norma-
tive, and/or subjective factors? 
• To what extent do they play a significant role in ordi-
nary, fictional, and/or scientific accounts of reality? 
• To what extent are they necessary to establish epis-
temic boundaries between truth and falsehood, fact 
and opinion, knowledge and faith, reason and expe-
rience? 
The aforementioned questions are relevant to explor-
ing the epistemological and sociological constitution of 
mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries – not least because 
they presuppose a fundamental distinction between, on 
the one hand, a misleading surface reality of appearances 
and, on the other hand, a deep, hidden, and potentially 
disconcerting reality of underlying structural and/or agen-
tial constituents. A comprehensive sociology of myster-
ies, conspiracies, and inquiries needs to address the pre-
ceding questions in order to grasp the social ramifica-
tions of cognitive distortion.
8.
At the core of Boltanski’s account of mysteries, conspira-
cies, and inquiries lies the relationship between entities 
and events. The link between the two is mediated by, 
and contingent upon, intentions and meanings as well as 
structures and actions. In this respect, the role of causal-
ity is central, raising important philosophical questions. 
One may suggest that, in practice, both natural scientists 
and social scientists are ‘naïve realists’, or at least ‘prag-
matic realists’, since they tend to take the existence of 
reality – and, by implication, the variables by which it is 
shaped, if not governed – for granted. One need not be a 
Humean to call the validity of such a naïve or pragmatic 
approach – which is based on unargued assumptions – 
into question.280 
One of the legitimate questions that defenders of 
‘methodological individualism’ may pose when reflecting 
on the premises that undergird ‘methodological collec-
tivism’ and ‘social holism’, however, is how it is possible 
279 Cf. Geuss (1981), Geuss (1994), Geuss (2001), Geuss (2014), Geuss 
(2017), and Geuss (2020).
280 See Hume (2007 [1748])
to prove the ontological status of collective entities. Argu-
ably, it is even more difficult to corroborate the thesis 
that collective entities exert causal, let alone purposive, 
power. And yet, sociology, although it is essentially an 
empirical science, contains an abundant amount of key 
concepts referring to ‘entities’ whose existence cannot be 
confirmed by means of our senses or scientific experi-
ments, but whose existence it nonetheless presupposes. 
Consider, for instance, the following concepts: the 
economy, class, culture, ethnicity, gender, and the state. 
It is not possible to touch, to see, to hear, to smell, or 
to taste any of these ‘entities’ directly. Sociologists (and 
non-sociologists) have access not to these ‘entities’ 
themselves but, rather, only to the symbolic and mate-
rial manifestations of their existence. Nevertheless, most 
sociologists (and non-sociologists) assume not only 
that these ‘entities’ exist but also that they exert a con-
siderable degree of power – notably in terms of shap-
ing behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of 
functioning. Similar to fundamental concepts in philos-
ophy, such as ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’, one may endorse 
a naturalist or materialist position by arguing that the 
universe is full of ‘emergent properties’281 and that, in 
this respect, the social world is no exception. In other 
words, the fact that we cannot prove the actuality of an 
‘entity’ by virtue of our senses is not a strong enough 
reason to exclude the possibility of its existence. 
Scientists – regardless of their area of specializa-
tion – need to provide robust (a) ontological, (b) episte-
mological, (c) terminological, (d) methodological, and 
(e) theoretical grounds on which to defend the follow-
ing assumptions: (a) an ‘entity’ exists in some way and 
on some level; (b) its existence and constitution can 
be known or at least inferred; (c) it can be appropriately 
defined and described; (d) it can be studied by suitable 
methods; and (e) it can be explained within a more or 
less systematic conceptual framework. Unless a particu-
lar concept passes all five of these ‘tests’, it is hard to see 
how its inclusion in a specific disciplinary vocabulary, let 
alone canon, can be justified. Both in the natural scienc-
es and in the social sciences, any serious inquiry into a 
given ‘entity’ (or set of ‘entities’) needs to offer solid onto-
logical, epistemological, terminological, methodological, 
and theoretical grounds on which its (or their) existence 
can be empirically and/or rationally substantiated.
9.
Boltanski’s analysis obliges us to reflect on the construc-
tion (and reconstruction) of key concepts in the humani-
ties and social sciences. Boltanski is right to be wary of 
281 See, for instance, Aziz-Alaoui and Bertelle (2009).
48 Simon Susen
a pronounced tendency among scholars and academics 
– who wish to focus on ‘getting on with their research’ – 
to take the meanings of key concepts for granted. Let us 
consider some issues related to this problem in further 
detail.
First, Boltanski posits that sociologists risk ‘merg-
ing with the fields of law or business administration and 
generating doubts about the added value of [their] con-
tributions’282 if they construct, endorse, and rely on con-
ceptual ‘schemas in which only already recognized enti-
ties appear’283. If, in other words, sociologists fall into 
the trap of conceptual conventionalism, whereby they 
make reference to, and aim to study, only those entities 
that, in terms of their representational status, are already 
incorporated into a particular canon or discipline, then 
they risk jeopardizing not only their intellectual auton-
omy and institutional identity but also, crucially, their 
capacity to grasp the social world in a truly enlightening 
and original manner. 
While, in principle, this is a legitimate point and, 
indubitably, a concern that sociologists (and social scien-
tists more generally) should take seriously, it is equally 
important to acknowledge that, over the past centuries, 
there has been a proliferation of new concepts, assump-
tions, and paradigms in the humanities and social sci-
ences, some of which have succeeded in transcending 
the stifling logic of academic ivory towers and in find-
ing their way into ordinary language. There is a danger 
in reproducing canonized conceptual ‘schemas in which 
only already recognized entities appear’284. At the same 
time, there is a danger in being driven by fashion or by 
the ambition to make sweeping claims, wrapped up in 
provocative terminology. Academic window-dressing 
practices may give the misleading impression that some-
thing hitherto undiscovered is being discovered, or that 
an original contribution is being made when, in fact, 
this may not be the case. As illustrated, for instance, in 
the widespread use of catchy terms such as ‘postindus-
trialism’, ‘postmodernism’, and ‘posthumanism’, it has 
become fashionable to proclaim ‘that we […] live in a 
post-something era’285. In short, rigid conceptual con-
ventionalism can be as problematic as playful semantic 
creationism, representing two complementary manifes-
tations of opportunistic Zeitgeist-surfing.286
Second, Boltanski states that ‘[o]ne of sociology’s 
difficulties stems from the fact that it studies both per-
282 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 233.
283 Ibid., p. 233.
284 Ibid., p. 233.
285 Wagner (1992), p. 467 (italics added). On this point, see also Susen 
(2015a), p. 18, and Susen (2020a), p. 170.
286 See Susen (2020a), pp. 156 and 328.
sons and entities that are not persons’287. He fails to spell 
out, however, that in all three main branches of knowl-
edge – that is, in the humanities, the social sciences, and 
the natural sciences – there are numerous academic dis-
ciplines concerned with the study of ‘both persons and 
entities that are not persons’288, that is, of both human 
and non-human entities. 
Moreover, Boltanski asserts that ‘no entity is so glo-
balizing or so totalizing that reference to it can condense 
the entire identity of a person’289. In his own work, how-
ever, Boltanski draws a useful distinction between ‘sim-
ple domination’ and ‘complex domination’.290 In the for-
mer, subjects are partially or wholly deprived of basic 
liberties, while their interactions are marked by pro-
found material and symbolic asymmetries, which are 
generated and reinforced by virtue of top-down physi-
cal force. In the latter, subjects are entitled, and even 
encouraged, to benefit from their basic liberties and to 
manage their lives as relatively free and autonomous 
agents, while accepting that inequalities of opportunity 
may translate into inequalities of outcome and that, 
crucially, structural asymmetries remain in place, but 
without being enforced in a top-down, let alone violent, 
manner. 
One need not be a Foucauldian to acknowledge that, 
both in regimes of ‘simple domination’ and in regimes of 
‘complex domination’, entities can be ‘so globalizing’ and 
‘so totalizing’ that reference to them can (at least ostensi-
bly) condense the entire identity of a person – precisely 
because their modes of governmentality, expressed in 
the establishment of normative orders and regulatory 
regimes, confirm the ubiquity of biopower through the 
effective disciplinary control of the human body.
10.
According to Boltanski, the development of sociology 
as a discipline from the mid-twentieth century onwards 
can, in several respects, be regarded as a response to 
what he describes as ‘Popper’s curse’291. As illustrated 
above, Boltanski seeks to provide a critical overview of 
287 Boltanski (2014 [2012]), p. 252.
288 Ibid., p. 252.
289 Ibid., p. 252 (italics added).
290 On the concept of ‘simple domination’, see, for example: Boltan-
ski (2008), esp. pp. 149–158; Boltanski (2009a), pp. 186–190; Boltanski 
(2011 [2009]), pp. 124–126. See also, for instance: Susen (2012b), pp. 
707–710; Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]), pp. 188–190; 
Susen (2014c), pp. 652–656; Susen (2016b), pp. 212–215. On the con-
cept of ‘complex domination’, see, for example: Boltanski (2008), esp. pp. 
149–158; Boltanski (2009a), pp. 190–193; Boltanski (2011 [2009]), pp. 
127–129. See also, for instance: Susen (2012b), pp. 707–710; Boltanski, 
Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]), pp. 188–190; Susen (2014c), pp. 652–
656; Susen (2016b), pp. 212–215.
291 See Boltanski (2014 [2012]), pp. 240–251.
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recent trends in sociology, arguing that the emergence 
of various key intellectual currents is symptomatic of 
the legacy of this ‘Popperian curse’. More specifically, 
he maintains that the following perspectives reflect the 
degree to which, in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, sociologists have sought to find a con-
vincing response to the challenges posed by Popper’s 
philosophy of science: methodological individualism; 
analytic Marxism; moderate and radical versions of 
structuralism; Bourdieu’s theory of practice; micro-soci-
ological approaches; network analysis; and, perhaps less 
obviously, sociological theories of multipositionality. The 
way in which Boltanski’s argument concerning ‘Popper’s 
curse’ is set up, however, is problematic for at least three 
reasons. 
First, unsympathetic critics may contend that Pop-
per’s account is based on a gross misrepresentation of 
the social sciences, especially sociology. In order to make 
his line of reasoning work, Popper presents a caricature 
of social-scientific research, especially when identify-
ing large parts of it as guilty of falling into the traps of 
‘social holism’, ‘methodological essentialism’, and ‘deter-
minist utopianism’ (and, by implication, ‘intentional-
ism’ and ‘historicism’). In the mid-twentieth century, the 
historical context in which Popper delivered his famous 
1948 lecture, several important modes of inquiry had 
entered the scene, some of which did not fit his unfa-
vourable diagnosis of the intellectual landscape preva-
lent at the time: interpretive sociology, critical theory, 
micro-sociology, ethnomethodology, existential(ist) soci-
ology, social phenomenology, and hermeneutics. These 
(and other) approaches had already gained traction and 
were largely at odds with Popper’s straw-man depic-
tion of the social sciences in the mid-twentieth century. 
Despite being aware that making reference to com-
munities or collectives is ‘hardly the sole prerogative of 
sociologists’292, Boltanski does not expose the distortive 
aspects of Popper’s analysis in a detailed, let alone evalu-
ative, fashion.
Second, Boltanski overstates the impact of Pop-
per’s critique on the development of sociology from the 
mid-twentieth century onwards. Undoubtedly, Popper’s 
account touches upon crucial issues with which sociolo-
gists, in different ways and from different angles, have 
been grappling for some time. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the frameworks they have developed in recent 
decades – notably those mentioned by Boltanski – are a 
(direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious) response 
to ‘Popper’s curse’. In other words, Boltanski seems to 
give Popper more credit than he deserves, at least in 
292 Ibid., p. 241.
terms of his alleged impact on the emergence of new 
sociological approaches from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards.
Third, even if – broadly speaking – one shares Bol-
tanski’s assessment of the lasting legacy of ‘Popper’s 
curse’, it is noticeable that key sociological perspectives 
that may be interpreted in the same vein have been 
omitted. Consider, for instance, the following influential 
sociological frameworks: social constructivism, intersec-
tionalism, feminism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, 
and postcolonialism. Of course, they do not share the 
basic assumptions underlying methodological individu-
alism; if anything, they are opposed to it. Similar to the 
other currents of thought mentioned by Boltanski, how-
ever, they articulate the need to challenge the validity of 
canonized dichotomies in the social sciences293 – includ-
ing paradigmatic antinomies such as ‘social holism’ vs. 
‘methodological individualism’, ‘methodological essen-
tialism’ vs. ‘methodological nominalism’, and ‘deter-
minist utopianism’ vs. ‘anti-determinist realism’ (not to 
mention ‘objectivism’ vs. ‘subjectivism’, ‘determinism’ vs. 
‘voluntarism’, and ‘structuralism’ vs. ‘intentionalism’). 
Arguably, they are also opposed to crude versions of 
‘historicism’, not least because all of them are, to a great-
er or lesser degree, inspired by Foucauldian critiques of 
modernist notions of reason, science, and progress.294 In 
this sense, they share Popper’s rejection of the collective 
pursuit of metanarratives, epitomized in the belief that 
history is reducible to an ensemble of unavoidable, pre-
dictable, progressive, directional, and universal devel-
opments, indicative of underlying forces driving social 
evolution. Admittedly, it would be misleading to charac-
terize the aforementioned sociological frameworks (that 
is, social constructivism, intersectionalism, feminism, 
poststructuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism) 
as ‘Popperian’. It is hard to ignore, however, that there is 
a substantial amount of overlap between their and Pop-
per’s respective criticisms of intentionalist and historicist 
forms of reductionism.
CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide 
a critical analysis of Boltanski’s account of the multifac-
eted relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and 
inquiries in modern societies. The first part has given 
an overview of Boltanski’s central theoretical contribu-
tions to our understanding of mysteries, conspiracies, 
and inquiries. The second part has offered some critical 
293 Cf. Jenks (1998).
294 See Allen (2016).
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reflections on important issues arising from Boltanski’s 
examination of the relationship between mysteries, con-
spiracies, and inquiries – especially with regard to its 
limitations and shortcomings. As demonstrated above, 
this key aspect of Boltanski’s work should not be over-
looked, as it illuminates our grasp of the similarities and 
differences between central – notably ordinary, fictional, 
scientific, criminal, and judicial – types of investigation. 
Most, if not all, modes of inquiry are motivated by the 
ambition to uncover the constitution of an underlying 
reality, which tends to be concealed beneath the veil of 
everyday modes of perception, appreciation, interpreta-
tion, and action. If there is a lesson to be learnt from the 
preceding analysis, it is that inquiries into the unknown, 
including those seeking to shed light on alleged myster-
ies and conspiracies, require as much scrutiny as their 
objects of study.
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